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PROJECT
PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS TO PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS:
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In order to overcome past discrimination,' to provide minority
representation both in the schools and the professions, 2 and possibly, to
overcome minority dissatisfaction, 3 a professional school may institute a
preferential admissions program (PAP) based upon race. The minority
applicant who, because of a low grade point average (GPA) and low test
scores, cannot be admitted through the regular admissions process, may be
admitted through the PAP. 4 The majority applicant who fails to be admitted
through the regular process is not eligible, because of his race, to take
advantage of this program and is therefore denied admission to the school. 5
This process has resulted in a wide disparity not only between the
quantifiable aptitude indicators - GPA and test scores - of those who are
admitted through the PAP and those admitted through the regular process,
but also between those admitted through the PAP and those denied
admission, for excluded majority applicants often have higher GPA's and
test scores than PAP-admitted minority applicants.6 Race is thus used not
1. See Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CH. L.
REV. 723, 724-26 (1974); Graglia, Special Admission of the "CulturallyDeprived" to
Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 354 (1970); O'Neil, Preferential Admissions:
Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to HigherEducation, 80 YALE L. J. 699, 702
(1971).
2. See Ely, supra note 1, at 725; O'Neil, supra note 1, at 700; see also Sandalow,
Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial
Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 654-58 (1975).
3. See Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1. The author suggests:
The Realpolitik argument against DeFunis is that preferential treatment of
blacks and other militant minorities is the price the white majority must pay for
avoiding the sort of unrest and violence of which the race riots of the 1960's were
arguably but the portents. More narrowly, preferential treatment in university
admissions may be the price of avoiding racial, and perhaps other types of
student, unrest such as was experienced by many universities and colleges in
that period. Although university administrators publicly justify their preferential
admissions policies in terms of increasing diversity, rectifying historical
injustices, and the like, in private they often will admit that appeasing student
militancy was the dominant factor in the adoption of the policies.
Id. at 26.
4. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977); Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
5. See note 4 supra.
6. For instance, under the PAP utilized by the University of California Davis
Medical School, which was scrutinized in Bakke 'v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18
Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977),
the applicant, Alexander Bakke, was denied admission although he had a rating
which was 20 to 30 points above some of the students admitted through the PAP. 18
Cal. 3d at 43-44, 553 P.2d at 1161, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 687.

(983)
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only as a factor to decide between quantifiable equals in the regular
admissions process, but also as a consideration which can outweigh past
academic performance. 7 Moreover, a certain number of positions may be set

aside specifically for PAP applicants, thereby limiting the admissions
opportunities of majority applicants.8
The excluded majority applicant will maintain that the implementation
of the PAP denied him equal protection since he was denied admission
because of race. 9 A claimant could initially argue that since any determination based upon race is invalid, race can never be considered even in a
decision between quantifiable equals; 10 and alternatively that even if racial
considerations are legitimate, race alone cannot be afforded such significance in a professional school admission decision.11

7. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d, 553 P.2d at 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977); Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
8. In the PAP under consideration in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18
Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 1098 (1977),
the University of California at Davis Medical School set aside 16 places for minority
applicants. Id. at 43, 553 F.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
9. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977); Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Commentaries concerning the validity of PAP's and affirmative action programs in
general are legion. See Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions Programs: A
Response to Professor Graglia, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1970); Ely, supra note 1; Fiss,
The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: AntidiscriminationLaw in the Second
Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974); Gellhorn,
The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069; Gellhorn & Hornby,
Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards - Beyond
Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REV. 975 (1974); Graglia, supra note 1; Greenawalt,
Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Hughes, Reparationsfor Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063
(1968); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (.1966); Karst & Korowitz,
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); Lavinsky,
DeFunis v. Odegaard: The Non-Decision With a Message, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 520
(1975); Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law
Admission, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1975); Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and
Admissions: A JurisprudentialApproach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1975); O'Neil, supra
note 1; Posner, supra note 3; Sandalow, supra note 2; Symposium - Disadvantaged
Students and Legal Education - Programsfor Affirmative Action, 1970 TOL. L. REV.
277; Viera, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by
Race, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1553 (1969).
There may also be affirmative action programs in employment. For a recent
commentary on affirmative action in employment in higher education, see Solomon &
Heeter, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Towards a Rationale for Preference,
52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41 (1976).

10. This type of argument seems to be based upon a rationale that all racial
discrimination is unconstitutional per se and thus that race is never a legitimate
consideration. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d at 45, 61-67 (1973) (Hale, C.J.,
dissenting), 507 P.2d at 1189, 1197-1200; see notes 71-73 & 126-39 and accompanying
text infra.
11. This type of argument springs from two different rationales. The first is the
"best qualified through merit criteria" approach to professional education. See notes
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A court reviewing this equal protection challenge will be faced with
questions of significant difficulty and import involving appropriate means,
legitimate ends, and the correct constitutional standard of review to be
applied. The purpose of this article is to focus upon and analyze the major
questions and problems presented by a PAP equal protection challenge. This
project will first review past cases involving equal protection and the
constitutional tests developed therein; second, discuss recent cases involving
equal protection challenges to PAP's; third, set forth the possible standards
for reviewing a PAP; and conclude with an analysis of the ends and means
problems involved in a constitutional decision on a PAP.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS

A.

General

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a state must
classify in order to achieve its legislative objectives. 12 The hundreds of
classifications made by states' 3 result, necessarily, in different classes of
people being treated differently.'4 The issue for the courts to decide is the
scope of this power to classify when a particular classification is challenged
as being unconstitutional.
Attacks on classifications are usually advanced on the grounds that
such classifications deny the complaining party the equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment." When a court evaluates
a particular classification, equal protection ordinarily demands that there be
some minimum connection between the challenged classification and its
objectives. 16 The traditional terminology of this examination is that the
classifying means of the particular state action must in some way be related
to legitimate legislative ends. 17 The extent of this scrutiny varies, however,
depending upon the type of classification involved. 18
176-191 and accompanying text infra. The second is the "slow integration by

nonsuspect means" approach apparently adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680,
(1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). For a discussion of Bakke, see notes 69-96
and accompanying text infra.
12. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
13. State action is required and must be alleged in order for the constitutional
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment to be invocable. See Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). For the text of the fourteenth amendment, see note 15 infra. For
purposes of this project, state action will be assumed.
14. For an in-depth analysis of the types of classifications made by legislators
and the relation of those classifications to the equal protection clause, see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
15. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For an analysis of the
history surrounding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, see note 26 infra.
16. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See
also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 14.
17. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
18. Although this section of the project will examine the traditional two-tiered
approach to reviewing a challenged classification, i.e., employment of either a
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Classifications are valid as a rule "if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify [them]"' 9 and if "all persons similarly circumstanced
[are] treated alike."20 There must be a reasonable relationship between the

means (the classification) and the ends (the legislative objective). 21 In
applying this standard, courts have deferred to the legislative determination
of objectives22 and, where the means used are merely rationally related to
"rational relationship" or a "strict scrutiny" standard (see text accompanying notes
19-33, infra) it should be noted that attempts to place all equal protection cases into
two neat categories is often a difficult task. As Justice Marshall, dissenting in San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), explained:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review
- strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of
equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this
Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum
clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will
scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Id. at 98-99. Commentators have suggested that the Burger Court is heading toward
the utilization of a third standard of review in equal protection decisions. See
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972). Gunther has labeled this standard of review "minimum scrutiny with a bite,"
emphasizing that, although purporting to use a rationality standard, the Court seems
to be scrutinizing classifications with greater care. Id. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). For a discussion of a middle level of review in a PAP context, see notes 97108 and accompanying text infra.
In two recent decisions, a plurality of the Supreme Court has apparently
applied a middle level of scrutiny, in determining the validity of gender based
classifications. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting
the sale of "nonintoxicating 3.2% beer" to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18. 429 U.S. 190. In holding the statute invalid, Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, stated that ",t.o withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at
197-98. The Court held that the differential in ages drawn by the statute with respect
to the purchase of beer by males and females, was not substantially related to the
achievement of regulating drinking and driving - the State's purported objective. Id.
at 204. In Califano, the Court invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970 & Supp. 1975), that required widowers, but not widows, to
prove that they were receiving at least one-half of their support from their deceased
spouse in order to qualify for survivor's benefits. 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977). Justice
Brennan again wrote the opinion for the Court, and in holding that the gender based
distinction violated the equal protection guarantees of the fifth amendment's due
process clause, adopted the standard of scrutiny articulated in Craig. Id. at 4240.
19. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
20. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). According to Royster,
states have the power to classify, "[b]ut the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation." Id. at 415.
21. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
22. The consideration given to the legislative judgment is typified in the leading
case of Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). In that case, a
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23
those legitimate ends, the typical state classification will be upheld.
However, when suspect classifications or fundamental interests are
involved, courts have reviewed more intensely the legislative objectives and
24
their relationship with the means selected to accomplish them.

In keeping with the original aim of the fourteenth amendment - the
elimination of racial discrimination 25 - classifications based upon race
New York City ordinance prohibiting the operation of vehicles bearing advertisements on the streets was challenged as a denial of equal protection. Id. at 107-08. The
regulation excepted vehicles which advertised the business of the vehicle's owner and
which were used primarily for other business purposes. Id. In holding that the
contested regulation was valid, the Court refused to consider the evidence itself to
determine if the purpose of the classification was sound, but instead accepted as
permissible the purpose determined by the municipality - traffic control - and
concluded that there was no evidence that the regulation was without relation to this
objective. Id. at 109. See also Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220
(1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). For an examination of the extent of
inquiry into the purpose of a particular classification, see Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
23. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan, the
Supreme Court explained that the fourteenth amendment gives the states discretion
in enacting laws which touch citizens differently. Id. at 425. In upholding a Maryland
statute which prohibited the sale of certain merchandise on Sunday, the Court
reasoned that the equal protection clause is not violated unless "the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Id. at
425. A classification, the Court held, "will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. The Court reasoned that the
legislature's exemption of certain items could reasonably be "necessary either for the
health of the populace or for the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the
day." Id. The Court, accepted this as a permissible, noninvidious purpose and
concluded that the classifications were rationally related to the legislative purpose. Id.
at 427-28.
24. Cases decided during the Warren Court years identified two areas where a
challenged classification would be subject to a vigorous evaluation: where a statute
employed a suspect classification or where the classification had an impact on a
fundamental interest. For a discussion of suspect classifications, see notes 25-33 and
accompanying text infra.
The fundamental interest strand of "strict scrutiny" involves an initial
finding by the Court that a particular activity is fundamental and thus deserving of
special protection. The Court then imposes a heavy burden of justification on any
classification which affects the activity. The primary examples of interests which the
Warren Court identified as fundamental are the right to vote, the right to a criminal
appeal, and the right to travel interstate. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has rejected a
claim that education was a fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny of any
classification affecting it. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
25. The fourteenth amendment was originally understood to have as its primary
purpose the protection of the civil rights of the recently emancipated blacks. The
Supreme Court has concluded that the principal purpose of the post-Civil War
amendments was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873). See also Developments supra
note 22, which states: "Historical analyses indicate that the immediate catalyst for
passage of the fourteenth amendment was the fear that significant Reconstruction
measures enacted by Congress would be held beyond the scope of congressional
power." Id. at 1068 (citation omitted). Because of the amendment's broad language,
the equal protection clause has been interpreted to protect the rights of all racial
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have been viewed with suspicion.26 If a suspect classification is challenged,
the scope of a state's power to classify is thoroughly scrutinized; to be valid
the classification must survive a "strict scrutiny" test. 27 The classification
must have more than a rational connection to a legitimate state purpose and

a heavy burden is placed upon the states to justify the use of such a
classification. 28 In most instances, in order for an alleged improper
groups and has long been considered as imposing restraints on the utilization of
classifications generally. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)

(guarantees of protection of the fourteenth amendment extend to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States). For an explanation of the history
surrounding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, see Bickel, The Original
Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955). See also G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

664-65 (9th ed. 1975).

26. As early as 1880, the Supreme Court indicated that it intended to implement
the underlying purposes of the fourteenth amendment by prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the
Court reversed a murder conviction by an all white jury, of a black man, on the
grounds that a state statute which denied blacks the rights to become jurors violated
the fourteenth amendment. Id. See note 29 infra.
The first explicit reference to race as a suspect classification warranting
exacting judicial scrutiny however, was in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). In sustaining a military exclusion order which applied to Americans of
Japanese descent, the Supreme Court stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and are subject to the
strictest scrutiny. Id. at 216. The particular exclusion order in that case, however,
survived a strict scrutiny examination. The Court held that the executive order was
constitutional because the exclusion of certain citizens was justified in view of the dire
and extreme circumstances of the war. Id. at 219. For recent decisions holding racial
classifications suspect, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
The primary classification subjected to a strict scrutiny evaluation has been
race; however, the Court has applied a "suspect" label to certain other classifications.
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state classifications based on
alienage are suspect). In other cases, the Court has hinted that more than mere
rationality is needed to justify certain classifications. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (classifications based on illegitimacy held invalid); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality) (gender based classification found invalid
with the plurality declaring sex to be a suspect class).
27. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
28. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964). In McLaughlin, the Supreme Cofirt invalidated as a denial of equal
protection a Florida statute which provided for the punishment of any black man and
white woman or any white man and black woman who, though not married to each
other, habitually lived in and occupied the same room during the night. Id. at 196. The
Court pointed out that the policy of the fourteenth amendment rendered racial
classifications "constitutionally suspect." Subjecting the statute to "strict scrutiny,"
the Court could find no compelling state interest for the racial classification. Id. at
193-94.
In Loving, the Court was faced with determining the validity of Virginia's
antimiscegenation statute which drew distinctions on the basis of race. 388 U.S. at 2.
The Court distinguished the analysis of equal protection applied to the Virginia
statute from cases involving no racial classifications and subjected the statute to the
"most rigid scrutiny" because a "suspect" classification was involved. The Court thus
concluded that there was no "overriding state purpose" for restricting one's freedom
to marry solely on the basis of race. Id. at 11.
For examples of racial classifications which have been held invalid under a
"strict scrutiny" analysis *by lower courts and affirmed per curiam by the Supreme
Court, see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (racial classification in referendum
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classification based upon race to survive "strict scrutiny" the court must
first find a compelling state interest; 29 this search involves an exacting
examination of the legislative purpose, with little deference given to
legislative judgment. 30 The court must also find a high degree of relevance
3
between the classification and the established compelling interest. ' This
latter aspect of the review - a strict scrutiny of the means - is often
expounded as a balancing test. 2 The burden is placed upon the state to
show both, that its objectives cannot be achieved by measures which do not
draw racial distinctions, and that the public interest in the classification
33
outweighs any injury suffered by private parties.
B.

Permissible Use of Racial Criteria

After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education
35
4
which rejected the 'separate but equal"doctrine and held that
(Brown I),3
provisions); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (racial segregation in prisons);
Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (designation of race in voting and property
records); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (designation of race on nomination
pages and ballots).
29. In determining whether there is a compelling state interest or purpose, it is
clear that a challenged classification will not survive any scrutiny if there is a
discriminatory purpose behind the particular classification. A classification, the
purpose of which is to discriminate on the basis of race, has been deemed invidious
and held invalid as violative of the fourteenth amendment. Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder,the Supreme Court held invalid a state statute which
denied blacks the right to become jurors because the statute perpetrated discrimination against the black solely on the basis of race. Id. Strauder established the
principle that if a classification relates rationally to a discriminatory purpose, it
denies equal protection because the purpose of the classification is impermissible and
not merely because the classification is based on race. Id. This rationale has been
applied in decisions striking down classifications, where the discriminatory purpose
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) or becomes apparent as the law is7 administered (see, e.g.,
Griffin v. New Kent County School, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). For an analysis of
impermissible purposes in equal protection decisions, see Developments, supra note 22
at 1081, 1091-1100. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of city
public swimming pools for economic reasons, after desegregation order, held valid,
despite some evidence of discriminatory motivation).
For a recent decision discussing purposeful discrimination, see Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (qualifying test, administered to applicants for District of
Columbia police department, held valid on grounds that claims of racial discrimination were not traced to racially discriminatory purposes despite evidence of
disproportionate effect on minority applicants).
30. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
31. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
32. See generally Developments, supra note 22, at 1103.
33. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The McLaughlin Court
stated'that even where there is a compelling state interest, a classification which
seems to discriminate on the basis of race will "be upheld only if it is necessary and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." Id.
at 196 (emphasis added).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. The separate but equal doctrine originated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). In that case the Court sustained a Louisiana law which required railway
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de jure segregation in the public schools was invalid3

6

22

various types of

state-maintained segregation were held unconstitutional in a number of per
curiam decisions which merely cited Brown I as authority.37 This reliance on
Brown I led many commentators to believe that the use of racial
classifications was unconstitutional per se. 8 In subsequent racial classification cases, however, the Court did not apply a per se rule but instead
emphasized that the state laws involved were unconstitutional because of
the absence of an "overriding statutory purpose" necessary to satisfy strict
judicial scrutiny.3 9 That the utilization of racial criteria may be justified in
certain circumstances was first recognized in the school desegration cases
decided in the aftermath of Brown I; these cases indicate that racial criteria
may be a valid factor in implementing court-imposed integration procedures.
companies to provide "equal but separate accommodations" for whites and blacks. Id.
at 540. The Court concluded that
[t]he object of the [14th] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social,
as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
Id. at 544.
In overruling Plessy, the Brown Court seemed to be adopting the position of
the first Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy. Justice Harlan, in discussing
the separate but equal concept had argued that:
[olur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be
regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the
land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. The Brown Court invalidated a state law permitting segregation of white and
black children in public schools solely on the basis of race. Id. at 494-95. In
evaluating the equality of the segregated school systems, the Court refused to look
only at tangible factors, such as the number and qualifications of teachers. Finding
that segregation generated a feeling of inferiority, the Court concluded that minority
children were deprived of equal educational opportunities because separate educational facilities in the field of public education were inherently unequal. Id.
Prior to Brown I, the Supreme Court had found the use of racial classifications in segregated graduate schools invalid because of the inequalities of intangible
benefits inherent in the separate facilities. See, e.g. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950).
37. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (beaches).
38. See Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools - Part I: The New
Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 22 (1963); Developments, supra note 22 at
1089.
39. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964). In McLaughlin, for example, the Court concluded that "[w]ithout such
justification the racial classification . . . is reduced to an invidious discrimination."
Id. at 192-93. For an explanation of these cases, see note 28 supra.
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The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of the remedies available to
counter the effect of state-maintained segregation in Brown 11.40 That case
emphasized that a transition to nondiscriminatory school admissions
policies was necessary to overcome past discrimination. 41 Implementation of
desegregation procedures was nevertheless essentially left to the discretion
of local school boards and it was not until Green v. New Kent County School
Board4 2 thirteen years later, that the Court imposed a duty to integrate
upon officially segregated public schools. In holding that a "freedom of
choice" plan of integration was inadequate, the Court stated that "[s]chool
boards [are] charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
43

would be eliminated.."

The issue of the validity of utilizing racial criteria as a permissible step
in desegregating the schools was finally resolved in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg Board of Education.44 Rejecting a challenge to the use of racial
quotas in student assignments, the Swann Court upheld a district court plan
of integration. 45 Although emphasizing that a certain proportionate
representation of races was not required by the fourteenth amendment, the
Court nevertheless affirmed the use of mathematical racial ratios as "a
starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible
requirement" and concluded that "the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District
46

Court."

40. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

41. Id. In Brown II, the Court initially reiterated the principle that racial

discrimination was unconstitutional in public education and then turned to the scope
of relief available in jurisdictions where such discrimination had been practiced. Id. at
298. Emphasizing that flexible remedies were available in equity, the Court stated
that "[w]hile giving weight to ... public and private considerations, the courts will
require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full
compliance" with the desegregation orders. Id. at 300.
42. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
43. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added). In Green, the Court was faced with
determining the constitutionality of a Virginia school board's "freedom of choice"
plan for desegregating the schools, which allowed students to attend schools of their
own choice without encountering racial barriers. Id. at 432-33. The Court held that
the plan was unacceptable since it did little realistically to dismantle the dual school
system. The Court, therefore, charged the district courts in the jurisdiction with the
responsibility to evaluate the effectiveness of the desegregation plan and to search for
available alternatives. Id. at 439-42.
It should be noted, that a distinction between de facto and de jure segregation
has been maintained by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973). Where there is a finding of a purpose or intent to segregate,
reflected in a state's laws or policies, de jure segregation exists and the Court will
require local school boards and the district court in the jurisdiction to implement a
plan of integration. Id. at 200. Where the segregation, however, is de facto - resulting
merely, for example, from a concentration of racial or ethnic groups in particular
neighborhoods - courts have not compelled integration. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati
Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Bell v.
School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id.
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In Swann, therefore, the Supreme Court determined that some
consideration of race by school authorities, where the purpose of the racial
classification is to bring together rather than to separate the races, does not
violate the fourteenth, amendment17 The Swann Court did not, however,
discuss whether the use of racial criteria had to meet the exacting standard
of a "strict scrutiny" test or the less stringent "mere rationality" standard.
The Court seemed to assume arguendo that the steps taken by the district
court were necessary and justifiable, given the exigent need to integrate the
48
public schools.
Attempts to redress past discrimination by giving special treatment to
particular racial groups have been labeled benign racial classifications. 49 In
addition to the desegration cases, the use of benign racial classifications has
emerged in areas such as public housing, 50 employment,51 and graduate and
47. For a recent interpretation of the legitimacy of the use of racial classifications
in certain contexts, as mandated by Swann, see Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
18 Cal. 3d 34, 70, 553 P.2d 1152, 1176-77, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 704-05 (1976) (Tobriner,
J., dissenting) cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
48. 402 U.S. at 22-25. See also North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971), a companion case to the original Swann decision. In that case, the
Court held unconstitutional a state antibusing law which had mandated color
blindness in its integration procedures by forbidding the assignment of students to
public schools on the basis of their race. Id. The Court stated that
if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit
or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing
of a dual school system, it must fall ....
Just as the race of students must be
considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also
must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To forbid, at this stage, all
assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of the one
tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to
eliminate existing dual school systems.
Id. at 45-46.
49. See Developments, supra note 22, at 1104-07.
50. See, e.g., Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)
(upholding the use of racial classifications in public housing).
51. Recent decisions by lower courts which have considered the utilization of
racial classifications in order to afford preferential treatment to minorities in
employment have not been uniform in deciding their validity. In Porcelli v. Titus, 431
F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit upheld the utilization of race as a factor in
choosing employees for promotion in the Newark school system. The Third Circuit
held that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of employees who were
named in a promotion list which had been destroyed in order to give priorities to
minority candidates, since the purpose of abolishing the list was to integrate the
faculty rather than to discriminate against the plaintiffs. Id. at 1256-57. For other
decisions discussing the use of racial criteria in employment, see, e.g., Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Masonry Contractors
Ass'n., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
The Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional attack on preferences for
qualified Native Americans in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974). Emphasizing the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal
law, the Court stated that the preference was not a racial preference but was rather an
employment criteria "reasonably and directly related to a legitimate nonracially
based goal." Id. at 553-55.
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professional education. 52 In light of the Supreme Court's affirmance of a
limited use of racial criteria, racial classifications are apparently not invalid
per se.5 3 The question remains, however, as to the standard of review a court
must use in testing the constitutionality of state remedial programs which
54
subject individuals to different treatment on the basis of race.
52. For recent decisions concerning the validity of utilizing racial classifications
in admission programs, see notes 55-110, and accompanying text infra.
53. See notes 34-48 and accompanying text supra.
54. A recent Supreme Court decision, upholding the validity of a state
legislature's utilization of racial considerations in drawing legislative districts,
provides a useful comparison. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.
v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977) the Court rejected an attack on the use of racial criteria
by a state legislature in an attempt to comply with section five of the Voting Rights
Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1971). 97 S. Ct. at 999-1011. Attempting to fulfill the
requirements of the Act in order to increase the representation of non-whites, New
York State submitted a plan of reapportionment to the Attorney General for a
determination that the plan did not have a racially discriminatory purpose. Id. at
1001-03. The plan, as approved, consisted of the redrawing of district lines to increase
nonwhite majorities in a few specified districts by reassigning and splitting the
petitioners' Hasidic Jewish community into different districts. Id. at 1003. The
petitoners alleged that this plan "would dilute the value of [their] franchise by
halving its effectiveness" for the purpose of achieving racial quotas, and that they
were assigned to districts solely on the basis of race. Id.
Justice White, announcing the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion,
examined the legislative history and case law interpreting the Act and concluded that
its purpose was remedial and would often necessitate racial considerations in drawing
district lines to reflect and protect the voting strength of the minority community. Id.
at 1005-11. Holding that the states' use of racial criteria was permissible, Justice
White emphasized that neither the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments prevented a
state subject to the Act from "deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in
particular districts" in order to assure compliance with the Act. Id. at 1007.
In a separate section of the opinion, joined by two other justices, Justice White
stated that "[w]hether or not the plan was authorized by or was in compliance with
...the ...Act," the action of the New York legislature did not violate the fourteenth
or fifteenth amendments, even assuming that the state had used race in a purposeful
manner. Id. at 1009. In support of this conclusion, Justice White maintained that the
"[reapportionment] plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to white or
any other race;" did not fence out the white population from participation in the
political process, and "did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength."
Id. Stating that no discriminating purpose or effect was found in the New York plan,
the Court concluded that
[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise
within tolerable population limits, because it dndertakes, not to minimize or
eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and,
through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the
legislative halls of the State.
Id. at 1011 (citation omitted).
It is interesting to note that, in 'a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
emphasized that the use of racial criteria in this case was validated simply by the
existence of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1011-16. However, Justice Brennan
disagreed with Justice White's conclusion that there would be no Constitutional
violation even in the absence of the Act. Id. Justice Brennan suggested that the
propriety of using racial criteria in a so-called benign manner presented "sensitive
issues of doctrine and policy" which he was content to leave unanswered until
another day. Id. at 1012-13. Although recognizing that "not every remedial use of
race is forbidden" and "that circumstances exist where race may be taken into
account," "Justice Brennan focused on issues that would have to be considered in
determining these "circumstances and.., how substantial a reliance may be placed
upon race." According to Justice Brennan, a court must consider 1) whether a
purported preference may in reality be a disguised disadvantageous treatment of
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TESTING PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS

A.

The Case Law

In the absence of Supreme Court authority on the constitutionality of
utilizing racial classifications in the context of a PAP, the few lower court
decisions which have dealt with the issue have searched for an appropriate
standard of review to determine whether a particular PAP denies an
individual equal protection. It is obvious that, because courts differ in their
interpretations of prior case law, and their attitudes towards the scope of
permissible or compelling state interests and the means by which to
accomplish those interests, no uniform standard for reviewing PAP's has
emerged.
In DeFunis v. Odegaard,55 a white applicant who was denied admission
to the University of Washington Law School brought an action in state
court alleging, inter alia, that his admission was denied because of the law
school's PAP and that the use of the PAP denied him equal protection of the
56
laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The lower court found

minorities; 2) whether classifications based upon race would tend to increase

"society's latent race consciousness" and 3) that benign classifications are "viewed as
unjust by many ... especially by those individuals who are adversely affected by a
given classification." Id. at 1013-15. In conclusion, Justice Brennan stated
In my view, if and when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy of benign racial
sorting, he must weigh the concerns that I have discussed against the need for
effective social policies promoting racial justice in a society beset by deep-rooted
racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here adequately struck that balance
in enacting the carefully conceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting
Rights Act. However the Court ultimately decides the constitutional legitimacy
of "reverse discrimination" pure and simple; I am convinced that the application
of the Voting Rights Act substantially minimizes the objections to preferential
treatment, and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices in
electoral redistricting.
Id. at 1014-15.
Chief Justice Burger dissented and in discussing the use of racial classifications emphasized that
,a.lthough reference to racial composition of a political unit may, under
certain circumstances, serve as a starting point in the process of shaping a
remedy, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 25
(1971), rigid adherence to quotas, especially in a case like this, deprives citizens
such as petitioners of the opportunity to have the legislature make a
determination free from unnecessary bias for or against any racial, ethnic or
religious group.
Manipulating the racial composition of electoral districts to assure one minority
or another its 'deserved' representation will not promote the goal of a racially
neutral legislature. On the contrary, such racial gerrymandering puts the
imprimatur of the State on the concept that race is a proper consideration in the
electoral process.
Id. at 1020 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, per curiam, 416 U.S.
320 (1974).
56. 82 Wash. 2d at 13, 507 P.2d at 1171-72. In order to determine which applicants
to admit to its first year class, the university's admissions committee followed certain
procedures which gave preference to minority groups such as Blacks, Chicanos and
American Indians which the committee determined had been discriminated against in
the past. Id. at 17-20, 507 P.2d at 1174-75.
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that the PAP violated equal protection and ordered DeFunis admitted,5 7 but
the Washington Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.5 8 Although the
controversy was later declared to be moot by the United States Supreme
Court,5 9 the state court's decision is important as an example of a method of
applying an equal protection analysis to a PAP.
In upholding the PAP, the Washington Supreme Court first concluded
that racial classifications in PAP's were not unconstitutional per se under
Brown I which the court read as prohibiting only those classifications which
"stigmatize a racial group with the stamp of inferiority."6 Both Green and
57. Reviewing the applications of minorities, the committee placed less weight on
the predicted first-year average in evaluating the ability of the particular applicant to
succeed than it did for majority applicants, and, in determining this probability of
success, the minority applicants were compared with one another and not with
majority applicants. Id. at 21, 507 P.2d at 1175-76.
58. Id. at 13-14, 507 P.2d at 1171-72. At the Washington Superior Court's trial,
the law school's admissions procedure was found to be unconstitutional per se under
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The trial court, in oral opinion,
articulated the reasoning behind its holding:
Since no more than 150 applicants were to be admitted the admission of less
qualified resulted in a denial of places to those otherwise qualified. The plaintiff
and others in this group have not, in my opinion, been accorded equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court decided that public education must
be equally available to all regardless of race.
After that decision the Fourteenth Amendment could no longer be stretched to
accommodate the needs of any race. Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead
to reprisals. In my opinion the only safe rule is to treat all races alike, and I feel
that is what is required under the equal protection clause.
82 Wash. 2d 26, 507 P.2d at 1178.
59. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The majority of the Court found the case moot, on the
ground that DeFunis had been admitted to the law school, had attended classes while
the case was in the courts, and was about to graduate. 416 U.S. at 316-17. Only

Justice Douglas wrote an opinion on the merits. He suggested that there were possible
cultural biases in the ordinary admissions criteria and would have remanded the case
for a new trial to consider this factor. Id. at 335-36. Strongly condemning the use of
racial factors in admissions criteria, he emphasized that although minority
applicants might be handled differently on the basis of a finding that Law School
Admission Test scores were culturally biased, decisions must be made on "the basis of
individual attributes, rather than according a preference solely on the basis of race."
Id. at 332. Justice Douglas commented:
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred ....
There is no
superior person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis who is white is entitled to
no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter
his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have his
application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner.

Id. at 336-37.
On remand, three justices of the Washington Supreme Court decided that

dismissal of the action was mandated by the United States Supreme Court's decision
to vacate the judgment. The six remaining justices addressed the merits, four arguing
that the prior decision should be reaffirmed and two dissenting. DeFunis v. Odegaard,
84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
60. 82 Wash. 2d at 27, 507 P. 2d at 1179. In reaching this conclusion, the court
observed that "'[p]referential admissions do not represent a covert attempt to
stigmatize the majority race as inferior; nor is it reasonable to expect that a possible
effect of the extension of education preferences to certain disadvantaged racial
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Swann, the court reasoned, have upheld racial classifications when as here,
'61
the purpose "is not to separate the races, but to bring them together."
The court then addressed the question of the appropriate standard of
review to be applied. Concerning the law school's contention that benign
racial classifications should be subject to minimum scrutiny, the court found
that the racial classification was not benign in its effect on the excluded
applicants and refused to apply the rational relation test. 62 The classification, according to the court, was inherently suspect and would have to pass
strict scrutiny.6 3 The DeFunis court discerned three reasons why there may
be a compelling State interest in an increase of minority representation: 1)
the need to eradicate the continuing effects of past racial discrimination; 2)
the fact that increasing minority representation would be advantageous to
all law students because they would benefit from the classroom discussions
of other races; and 3) the need to rectify minority underrepresentation in the
legal profession. 64 Moreover, since the PAP at issue in DeFunis gave special
minorities will be to stigmatize whites.'" Id. at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179, quoting O'Neil,
supra note 1, at 713.
Similarly, Professor Ely criticizes the type of analysis which concentrates on
invidiousness because such an analysis seems to focus only on those discriminations
which are defined as harmful. Ely, supra note 1, at 730 n. 36.
61. 82 Wash. at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179.

62. Id. at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182. According to the court:
It has been suggested that the less strict "rational basis" test should be
applied to the consideration of race here, since the racial distinction is being used
to redress the effects of past discrimination; thus, because the persons normally
stigmatized by racial classifications are being benefited, the action complained of
should be considered "benign" and reviewed under the more permissive standard.
However, the minority admissions policy is certainly not benign with respect to
nonminority students who are displaced by it.
Id., citing O'Neil, supra note 5, at 710. For a discussion of the rational relation test,
see notes 17-24 and accompanying text supra.
63. 82 Wash. 2d at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny test
see notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
64. 82 Wash. 2d at 32-35, 507 P.2d at 1182-84. But see Graglia, Special Admission
of the Culturally Deprived to Law School, 3 BLACK L.J. 232 (1974). (achieving a racial
mix is not a proper end of higher education). One commentator suggests that a
fundamental purpose of PAP's is to prevent the minority's dissatisfaction with the
system from erupting into violent conflict. See Posner, supra note 3, at 26.
In deciding that the school had a compelling state interest in implementing
the PAP, the DeFunis court rejected the plaintiff's contention that "since the law
school itself has not actively discriminated against minority applicants, it may not
attempt to remedy racial imbalance in the law school student body, and, consequently, throughout the legal profession." 82 Wash. 2d at 33, 507 P.2d at 1182-83. The
court reasoned:
The de jure-de facto distinction is not controlling in determining the constitutionality of the minority admissions policy voluntarily adopted by the law school.
Further, we see no reason why the state interest in eradicating the continuing
effects of past racial discrimination is less merely because the law school itself
may have previously been neutral in the matter.
Id. at 34-35, 507 P.2d at 1183. (footnote omitted). In dismissing this contention the
court raised and avoided answering the question whether de jure discrimination exists
in the standardized admission test or the law school's teaching methods. According to
the court: "We do not, therefore, reach the question of whether there is an inherent
cultural bias in the Law School Admission Test, or in the methods of teaching and
testing employed by the law school, which perpetuates racial imbalance to such an
extent as to constitute de jure segregation." Id. at 34 n.13, 507 P.2d at 1183 n.13. For a
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consideration only to those minorities who were underrepresented in the
school and who could not "secure proportionate representation if strictly
subjected to the standardized mathematical criteria for admission," 65 the
program was upheld.
In contrast to the DeFunis majority, the dissent felt that giving any
preferences to minority racial groups was per se unconstitutional. The
Constitution, the dissent stated, must be color blind. 66 The dissent reasoned
that the kind of rationale used in busing cases such as Green and Swann
was inapplicable to the case at bar since a PAP not only consciously aids
minorities, but also results in harm to nonminority students.6 7 Thus, while
the DeFunis majority viewed the discrimination against majority applicants
as giving rise to the necessity for strict scrutiny, the dissent; because of this
discrimination against the majority applicant, would have held that the
68
PAP could never pass constitutional muster.
criticism of the validity of the standardized testing and merit criteria generally, see
Baeza, Efficiency, Equality and Justice in Admissions Procedures to Higher
Education: A ConstitutionalModel for Resolving Conflicting Goals and Competing
Claims, 3 BLACK L.J. 132 (1974); Bell, In Defense of Minority Admissions Programs:A
Response to Professor Graglia, 3 BLACK L.J. 241, 241-43 (1974).
65. 82 Wash. 2d at 37, 507 P.2d at 1184. Concerning the possibility that the
compelling state interest could be achieved thiough a less restrictive means the court
concluded:
It has been suggested that the minority admissions policy is not necessary,
since the same objective could be accomplished by improving the elementary and
secondary education of minority students to a point where they could secure equal
representation in law schools through direct competition with non-minority
applicants on the basis of the same academic criteria. This would be highly
desirable, but 18 years have passed since the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
...and minority groups are still grossly underrepresented in law schools. If the
law school is forbidden from taking affirmative action, this underrepresentation
may be perpetuated indefinitely. No less restrictive means would serve the
governmental interest here; we believe the minority admissions policy of the law
school to be the only feasible "plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now."
Id. at 36, 507 P.2d at 1184, quoting Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 439 (1968) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
66. 82 Wash. 2d at 45, 507 P.2d at 1189.
67. Id. at 64-66, 507 P.2d at 1199-1200. For a discussion of the Green and Swann
rationales, see notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. 82 Wash. 2d at 66-67, 507 P.2d at 1200. The dissenters disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that a PAP was the only possible means by which to achieve
increased minority representation, and maintained that any other means would be
more appropriate. Several alternative methods were articulated as follows:
Although the courts have neither the power nor the aptitude to operate a
university and should be without the inclination to do so, several possible
methods come to mind which prima facie, at least, meet the fairness and equal
protection standards of the constitutions. One would be a system of comprehensive competitive examinations in predesignated courses such as English, history,
basic science, mathematics, economics and sociology, and with optional courses
in other fields selected by the student.
Another method would be to work out a reasonably accurate mathematical
correlation between grade values from different colleges or universities in
preannounced prelaw courses and to compute those equivalent grades with
admission granted the 150 students with the highest grades. This gives every
student a fair chance to achieve his ambition.
Another possible solution - in case the faculty believes that high prelaw
grades should not be in the main criterion - prescribe a sound but not
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The route taken by the DeFunis dissent has not been the only method of
declaring

PAP's invalid. In Bakke v.

Regents of the University of

9
California,6
the California Supreme Court struck down a PAP,7 ° holding

extraordinarily high prelaw grade standard and make a random selection by lot
and chance of the 275 applicants to be admitted from among those qualifying.
And the fairest way of all - but I doubt its efficacy - admit all applicants
possessing a minimum prerequisite grade point in prescribed courses, conduct the
law classes in the field house or stadium, if necessary, give frequent examinations, and let the better qualified few survive on the basis of their grades in law
school. There are, of course, other methods equally fair and impartial which may

be readily developed, all of which will meet the constitutional tests of fair and

impartial application. But whatever scheme is developed, one thing is certain:
Keep it within the principles of the constitutions, no one can be preferred and no
one can be disparaged because of race, color, creed, ethnic origin or domestic
environment.
Id. at 65-66, 507 P.2d at 1199-1200 (Hale, C. J., dissenting). The means suggested by
the dissent indicate a preference for concentrating on merit criteria for admission.
These merit criteria have been criticized. See Bell, supra note 9 at 241-43; Baeza,
supra note 64, at 138-40.
There are alternative means which can be suggested which are not based
purely upon merit considerations: one alternative focuses primarily on removing the
suspect classification and involves redefining the group along socially deprived or
underprivileged lines. See Posner, supra note 3 at 21-26. However, it seems that the
dissent would not even allow these means. Rather, it asserts:
If it is the state policy - and I think it should be - to afford special training,
guidance and coaching to those students whose domestic environment has
deprived them of a fair chance to compete, or to provide financial assistance to
students in economic straits, it is within the state's constitutional powers to do so,
but once these students have reached the point of seeking admission to a
professional or graduate school, no preference or partiality can or should, under
the constitutions be shown them.
82 Wash. 2d at 66, 507 P.2d at 1200 (Hale, C. J., dissenting). This broad dismissal by
the dissent of economic and social deprivation factors might be read as indicating a
correlation between race and social deprivation. The dissent might have been
addressing the majority's conclusion concerning the rationale for preferential
treatment along racial lines. In this context the language could be construed to mean
that social deprivation is an insufficient reason for using a suspect classification race. On the other hand, it appears that the dissent's adherence to merit criteria could
be indicative of a view that social deprivation should never be a consideration in
professional school admission, even when the preference is not based on a suspect
classification. This latter argument would disallow any nonmerit preference such as a
preference based upon resident or veteran status.
69. 18 Cal. 3d 34, cert. 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S.
Ct. 1098 (1977). In 1973 and 1974, Allan Bakke, a caucasian, was denied admission to
the medical school of the University of California at Davis (University). Id. at 38, 553
P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683. Bakke filed a complaint against the University
alleging that he was the victim of invidious discrimination - that because of the use
of preferential standards, minority applicants less qualified than he were accepted and that his application was rejected solely on the basis of his race. Id. Seeking
mandatory, injunctive and declaratory relief, Bakke alleged that the PAP denied him
the equal protection of the laws. Id.
70. One hundred places were available for the first year class at the University.
Id. at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683. Eighty-four places were selected
according to the regular admissions program which based its assessment upon a
combination of factors such as application information, test scores on the Medical
College Admission Test [hereinafter referred to as MCAT], recommendations,
interviews, grade point averages, motivation and character. Id. at 38-44, 553 P.2d at
1155-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683-87. Sixteen places were reserved for applicants who
qualified under a PAP which provided for a special admissions committee to screen
applicants for the purpose of integrating "the student body and the medical
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that, while a state may develop programs designed to increase minority
representation in medical schools, race, in and of itself, may not be the
determinative factor for admission. 7' In so holding, the court approached the
problem in a manner similar to the DeFunis majority. The court reasoned
that while cases such as Swann made it clear that not all classifications
based upon race are unconstitutional per se, a strict scrutiny of the
72
classification was necessary.
profession" and increasing "the number of doctors practicing in the minority
community." Id. at 39-44, 553 P.2d at 1156-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684-87. Only
minority students had been admitted under the program and the court found that
nonminority applicants were barred from participation in the special admissions
program. Id.
Different objective standards were used as criteria for selection under the two
admission plans. In determining which applicants would be offered admission, the
regular committee automatically disqualified applicants with a grade point average
below 2.5, while the PAP - restricted to reviewing minority applications - did not
have this cutoff and "some minority students who were admitted under the special
program . . .had grade point averages below 2.5" Id. at 43-44, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 686. In addition, most of the minority students admitted under the
program had lower MCAT test scores and benchmark ratings - a combined
numerical rating which reflected such factors as, for example, scores, grades, and
interviews - than nonminority applicants who were denied admission. Id. at 42-45,
553 P.2d at 1157-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 685-87. Bakke had a grade point average of 3.51
and scored in the 90th percentile in three of the four categories on the MCAT. Id. at
43, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
71. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1155, 1166, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 683, 694. The
trial court found that Bakke was entitled to be evaluated without consideration of his
race and concluded that the PAP was discriminatory and unconstitutional; however,
because Bakke could not show that he would be admitted even if there had been no
PAP, injunctive relief ordering admission was denied. Id. at 39, 553 P.2d at 1156, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 684. The California Supreme Court held that the PAP, as administered
by the university, violated the constitutional rights of nonminority applicants because
it gave preference according to race to those less qualified than the majority
applicants who were denied admission. They also viewed minority status, in itself, as
not a substantive qualification and concluded that because of the lower ratings, the
PAP admitted minority applicants were less qualified than some nonminority
applicants denied admission "because they were not members of a minority race." Id.
at 38, 47-48, 553 P.2d at 1156, 1161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684, 687-89. The court also
reversed the lower court's denial of an injunction, concluding that, since Bakke had
established that he had been discriminated against, the burden fell on the university
to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted if the university had not had
the PAP. Id. at 63-64, 555 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
72. Id. at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688. The Bakke court,
distinguishing Swann and other cases which allowed racial classifications which
benefited minorities, stated that
[i]n none of them did the extension of a right or benefit to a minority have the
effect of depriving persons who were not members of a minority group of benefits
which they would otherwise have enjoyed.
...The disadvantages suffered by a child who must attend school some
distance from his home or is transferred to a school not of his qualitative choice
cannot be equated with the absolute denial of a professional education, as
occurred in the present case.
Id. at 46-47, 553 P.2d at 1160-61,132 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89. For a discussion of Swann,
see notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
The university had argued that
[a] "compelling interest" measure is applicable only to a classification which
discriminates against a minority, reasoning that racial classifications are suspect
only if they result in invidious discrimination ... and that invidious discrimination occurs only if the classification excludes, disadvantages, isolates, or
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The university had asserted that there were three principal objectives
justifying the PAP. Preferential treatment to minorities, the school claimed,
was necessary first, "to integrate the medical school and the profession,"
second, to "increase the number of doctors willing to serve the minority
community" and third, to provide black doctors for black patients because
"black physicians would have a greater rapport with patients of their own
73
race" and would be more interested in treating diseases common to blacks.
The court rejected the university's last assertion on the grounds that there
was no evidence justifying this implicit parochialism and that the
sanctioning of such an objective would be directly contrary to the
constitutional goal of the "'elimination of all racialbarriers.' "74 Assuming
arguendo that the other justifications were compelling, the court still found
the PAP in question invalid on the ground that the university did not meet
its burden of establishing that its objectives could not be "achieved by
means less detrimental to the rights of the majority. '75 Concerning the
university's objective of integrating the student body, the court rejected the
stigmatizes a minority or is designed to segregate the races. The argument is that
white applicants denied admission are not stigmatized in the sense of having cast
about them an aura of inferiority; therefore, it is sufficient if the special admission
program has a rational relation to the University's goals.
Id. at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691. Rejecting the contention that the
utilization of the more lenient "rational basis" standard was more appropriate and
that the stricter standard is to be applied only where there is discrimination against a
minority, the majority stated:
[wie cannot agree with the proposition that deprivation based upon race is
subject to a less demanding standard of review under the fourteenth amendment
if the race discriminated against is the majority rather than a minority. We have
found no case so holding and we do not hesitate to reject the notion that racial
discrimination may be more easily justified against one race than another.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In support of its conclusion, the majority asserted:
[TIhat whites suffer a grievous disadvantage by reason of their exclusion from the
University on racial grounds is abundantly clear. The fact that they are not also
invidiously discriminated against in the sense that a stigma is cast upon them
because of their race, as is often the circumstance when the discriminatory
conduct is directed against a minority, does not justify the conclusion that race is
a suspect classification only if the consequences of the classification are
detrimental to minorities.
Id. at 50-51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
The majority also emphasized that the equal protection clause "applied to
'any person;'" that "[tihe rights created by the ... Fourteenth Amendment are, by its
terms, guaranteed to the individual" and that the clause's lofty purpose - to secure
equality of treatment to all - is incompatible with the premise that some races may
be afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal treatment than others. Id. at
51 & n.17, 553 P.2d at 1163 & n.17, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691 & n.17, citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Finally, the majority stated that, although there were no Supreme Court
decisions dealing directly with this issue, "recent decisions of the high court
demonstrate a marked reluctance to apply different standards to determine the rights
of minorities and members of the majority." 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163-64, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 691-92, citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. 427 U.S. 273
(1976). For a further discussion of McDonald, see note 110 infra.
73. Id. at 52-53, 553 P.2d at 1163-64, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
75. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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notion that without a PAP minorities would not gain admission.7 6 Stating
that there was no "rule of law" that a university must use only objective
criteria in admission decisions, the court pointed out that the university
could adopt flexible admission standards.7 7 Consideration of such factors as
th6 degree to which low GPA's and test scores actually reflected the ability
of the minority applicant, personal interviews, recommendations, potential
for success, and matters relating to the needs of the profession, among other
things, 78 were held to be viable alternatives to traditional admissions
criteria, as long as they were not "utilized in a racially discriminatory
manner."79 If these elements were not "related to race,

. .

. they [would]

provide for consideration and assistance to individual applicants who have
suffered previous disabilities, regardless of their surname or color." 80
With respect to the university's second major objective - the recruitment of more doctors for the minority community - the court conceded that
this was an urgent and legitimate interest, but, similar to its analysis of the
school's objective of integrating the student body, the court found no
evidence demonstrating that the PAP was the "least intrusive or even the
most effective means" of achieving that goal. 81 The university could not
show that the minority students admitted would actually practice in a
minority community. On the contrary, the court reasoned that "[a]n
applicant of whatever race who has demonstrated his concern for
disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such
a community is his primary professional goal would be more likely to
contribute to alleviation of the medical shortage than one who is chosen
entirely on the basis of race and disadvantage."8 2 In other words, the
majority reasoned that the means used were not necessary to bring about
the desired ends and emphasized that the university had not even
"considered the adoption of

...

non-racial alternatives to the special

83
admission program.
Deciding that the university's PAP did not meet the requirements of a
"strict scrutiny" test, the Bakke majority proceeded to refute the contention
that cases upholding preferential employment of minorities supported the

76. Id. at 53-54, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693. The university had argued

that since the grades and test scores of most minority applicants were lower than
majority applicants, no minority applicants would gain admission without preferential consideration. Id.
77. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1165-66, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94.
78. Id. The court also suggested that minority representation could be increased
through aggressive recruiting tactics, through remedial schooling for the disadvantaged, or by increasing "the number of places available in the medical schools." id. at
55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
79. Id. The majority stressed that "[d]isadvantaged applicants of all races must
be eligible for sympathetic consideration, and no applicant may be rejected because of
his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied
without regard to race." Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
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university's position in the case at bar. 4 The majority explained that those
cases involved a finding that the particular employer involved had
discriminated in the past and that, absent such a finding, federal courts
have invalidated such preferential treatment on the ground that it deprived
members of the majority of benefits solely on the basis of race.8 5 Since there
was no evidence in the record showing that the university had discriminated
against minorities in the past, the court concluded that the cases cited by the
86
university did not control the instant case.
The Bakke majority would thus subject a challenged PAP to strict
scrutiny, which would, unlike the DeFunis majority's strict scrutiny test,
involve a strenuous search for less intrusive alternatives to accomplish the
goals of the PAP in question. Unlike the DeFunis dissent, however, which
held preferential treatment on the basis of race unconstitutional per se, the
Bakke majority emphasized that increasing minority representation was a
compelling state interest and that a PAP might possibly be constitutional so
long as the admissions criteria were not "utilized in a racially discriminatory manner."
The fundamental disagreement between the majority and dissent in
Bakke centered around the standard of review employed in determining
whether the PAP satisfied constitutional guarantees. Agreeing with the
Bakke majority and both DeFunis opinions, the Bakke dissent felt that
PAP's should be carefully scrutinized; but in adopting a relatively liberal
87
standard of review, it would have upheld the PAP under consideration.
Although acknowledging that there was a well-established policy of strictly
reviewing classifications based upon race, 88 the dissent noted that racial
classifications have been held to be constitutionally suspect or presumptively unconstitutional only when they are deemed "invidious," that is,
where they exclude a particular racial group with the result that the racial
group is stigmatized as inferior. 89 The dissent, insisting that the majority
had misinterpreted prior case law, further observed that where a racial
classification is used to remedy the effects of past discrimination, numerous
84. Id. at 57-59, 553 P.2d at 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97. The university had

relied upon a number of cases which upheld the validity of preferential programs in
an employment context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp., Inc. 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
85. 18 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 553 P.2d at 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97. The
majority reasoned that if there were a finding of past discrimination, a "need for
remedial measures to compensate minorities" arose, but if there were no showing of
discrimination, it would be unconstitutional to utilize racial classifications to grant a
benefit to the minority race at the expense of the majority. Id.
86. Id. at 59-60, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697. The majority rejected the
argument that reliance upon grades and MCAT scores "amounted to discrimination
in fact against minorities." Id.
87. Id. at 64-66, 533 P.2d at 1172-74, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700-02 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
88. Id. at 67, 553 P.2d at 1174, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 702, citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927), Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
89. 18 Cal. 3d at 67-68, 553 P.2d at 1175, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
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decisions have upheld their validity in such areas as the desegregation of
public schools, public housing, and employment.90 The dissent concluded
that the PAP in the case at bar was not invidious since it did not intend to

90. Id. at 70-75, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 704-08, 553 P.2d at 1176-80, citing, inter alia,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (desegregation of
public schools); Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)

(public housing); and Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970) (employment). For

a discussion of the Porcelli case, see note 51 supra. For a discussion' of Swann, see
notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
The Bakke dissent stated that
numerous decisions recognize that as a practical matter racial classifications
frequently must be employed if the effects of past discrimination and exclusion
are to be overcome and if integration of currently segregated institutions is to be
achieved; these cases establish that the Constitution does not forbid such use of
remedial racial classifications.
18 Cal. 3d at 65, 553 P.2d at 1173, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The dissent relied especially
on the Swann rationale concerning the validity of racial classifications and concluded
that it was directly applicable, stating that
[hiere, the educational authorities have concluded that in order to prepare medical
students to live and practice in a pluralistic society, the medical school should
have an integrated student body, and they have utilized racial classifications to
achieve such integration. Swann teaches that such a noninvidious use of racial
classifications "is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities
Id. at 70, 553 P.2d at 1177, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (emphasis supplied by the court),
quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
The majority had claimed that benign racial classifications were upheld in
the past only where they did not involve any detriment to minorities or were utilized
to remedy past discrimination by a particular defendant. 18 Cal. 3d at 57-59, 553 P.2d
at 1168-96, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97. The dissent attempted to rebut these
generalizations by emphasizing that in many of the employment cases, the hiring of
minorities certainly deprived some nonminority applicants of a benefit they would
have enjoyed but for their race. Id. at 73-75, 553 P.2d at 1179-80, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707-09. The dissent also maintained that the university's PAP was intended "to overcome
the continuing effect of past discrimination in this country," thus negativing a
requirement that the university itself must be found to have engaged in past racial
discrimination. Id. at 75-76, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
It should be noted that the dissent also disagreed heatedly with the majority's
finding that less qualified applicants had been admitted under the PAP. Id. at 65-66,
553 P.2d at 1173-74, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02. The dissent reasoned that
[b]y adopting the special admission program, the medical school has indicated
that in its judgment differences in academic credentials among qualified
applicants are not the sole nor best criterion for judging how qualified an
applicant is in terms of his potential to make a contribution to the medical
profession or to satisfy needs of both the medical school and the medical
profession that are not being met by other students.
Id. at 66, 553 P.2d at 1173-74, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02. In contrast is the majority's
statement that
[t]he fact that all the minority students admitted under the special program may
have been qualified to study medicine does not significantly affect our analysis of
the issues. . . . Bakke was also qualified for admission, as were hundreds, if not
thousands of others who were also rejected. In this context the only relevant
inquiry is whether one applicant was more qualified than another .... Bakke
alleged that he and other non-minority applicants were better qualified for
admission than the minority students accepted . . .and the question we must
decide is whether the rejection of better qualified applicants on racial grounds is
constitutional.
Id. at 48, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (emphasis supplied by the court).
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exclude any racial group but rather attempted to ensure that all racial
groups would have some representation in the institution. 91
Although it found the classification to be benign, the dissent rejected the
use of the rational relation standard which some courts had used in the past
to test such classifications. 92 They formulated a different standard,
reasoning that a court should take a cautious approach in evaluating benign
racial classifications "[i]n light of the historical misuse of racial classifications in this country." 93 Finding that a remedy aimed at overcoming the
effects of past discrimination by promoting integration was compelling, the
dissent would require first that there be a finding by the court that the PAP
under review was employed as a "good faith attempt to promote integration"
and second, that the racial classification embodied in the PAP be related
directly and reasonably to that interest. 94 Since the dissent had already
determined that benign racial classifications were not constitutionally
suspect and, therefore, not subject to strict scrutiny, the existence of
alternative remedial measures was not relevant in testing the validity of the
PAP. 95 Finding that, in the case at bar, the "racial classifications were
91. Id. at 68, 553 P.2d at 1175, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703. The dissent also pointed out
that "the racial classifications [in Bakke] do not stigmatize any racial group as an
'inferior' race, but instead give realistic recognition to the continuing effects resulting
from several centuries of discriminatory treatment." Id. (footnote omitted).
In addition to reliance upon prior case law, the dissent reasoned that a
distinction between invidious and benign racial classifications was warranted by the
history of the fourteenth amendment and by the philosophy behind the utilization of a
strict standard of review. Id. at 78-79, 553 P.2d at 1182-83, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
Initially, the dissent emphasized that the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was
to protect the civil rights of the blacks and they could find nothing in its history
suggesting that it precludes a state from affording preferential treatment to
minorities. Id. The dissent also explained that
[h]eightened judicial scrutiny is accordingly appropriate when reviewing laws
embodying invidious racial classifications, because the political process affords
an inadequate check on discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities"
.... By the same token, however, such stringent judicial review is not
appropriate when, as here, racial classifications are utilized remedially to benefit
such minorities, for under such circumstances the normal political process can be
relied on to protect the majority who may be incidentally injured by the
classification scheme.
Id. at 79-80, 553 P.2d at 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (emphasis supplied by the court)
(citations and footnotes omitted). For criticism of this theory, see Posner, supra note 3
at 12-32.
92. For cases utilizing a rational relation standard in upholding racial
classifications, see note 51 supra.
93. 18 Cal. 3d at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
94. Id. at 80-81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712. Although recognizing that
a court should take a "cautious approach" in evaluating benign racial classifications,
the dissent emphasized that "a court must also be mindful that remedies for the
continuing effects of past discrimination have proven distressingly elusive, and that
it is therefore important that entities attempting in good faith to promote integration
be give reasonable leeway in experimenting with various methods to achieve this
compelling societal objective." Id. at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
Id. at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
95. Id. at 89, 553 P.2d at 1189-90, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18. Applying a different
standard of review than the majority, the dissent maintained that under their test
"[i]f alternative remedies are relevant to the constitutionality of the program at all,
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clearly devised as a realistic attempt to promote integration," the dissent
96
concluded that the PAP should be upheld.
The Bakke dissent is not the only opinion to depart from the traditional
two-tiered equal protection analysis. 9 7 Faced with deciding the validity of a
PAP 98 in a publicly-funded medical school, the New York Court of Appeals
in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center99 utilized the sliding scale approach
to equal protection expounded by Justice Marshall in his dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.100 Such an approach
recognizes the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests but, additionally,
proposes a middle level of scrutiny,' 0 ' with the degree of care which a court
will examine a particular classification depending upon "the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn."102 Accordingly, the Alevy court rejected a strict scrutiny approach
to PAP's, emphasized that the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
achieve equality for blacks, and observed that the amendment had been
10 3
interpreted to permit remedial measures to redress past discrimination.
Reasoning that any preference on the basis of race presented such
''untoward consequences" as "polarization of the races," diminution of
incentive in the discriminated group, labeling the advantaged group as
being less qualified, and "perpetuating undesirable perceptions of race as
criteria affecting state action," the Alevy court concluded that PAP's
"should be subject to more careful scrutiny than traditional standards of

the party attacking the validity of the program should bear the burden of
demonstrating the realistic availability of alternative methods of achieving the
medical school's numerous objectives." Id. at 89, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
718.
96. Id. at 81, 553 P.2d at 1184, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The dissent stated that any
one of the enumerated purposes of the PAP would serve to justify it. Id. at 80-86, 553
P.2d at 1184-88, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
97, For a discussion of the two-tiered approach to analyzing equal protection
problems, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
98. The PAP in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center consisted of a special system
of marking and considering minority applicants; applications of blacks, Puerto
Ricans, Mexican Americans and American Indians were separated and scrutinized
more thoroughly to determine whether they were "culturally deprived." 39 N.Y.2d 326,
329-30, 348 N.E.2d 537, 540-41, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85-86 (1976). Petitioner, a magna
cum laude graduate of Brooklyn College, was placed on a waiting list and
"commenced this proceeding alleging that his qualifications for admission were
superior to those of other applicants to whom respondent had arbitrarily granted
preferential treatment in violation of the law." Id. at 328, 348 N.E.2d at 540, 384
N.Y.S.2d 84-85.
99. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
100. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For further discussion of this sliding scale approach, see
note 18 supra; G. GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 657-65. For earlier cases exemplifying
Justice Marshall's departure from two-tiered equal protection analysis, see Chicago
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
101. 39 N.Y.2d at 333-34, 348 N.E.2d at 543-44, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 88-89, citing inter
alia, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
102. 411 U.S. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For recent decisions applying a
middle level standard see note 18 supra.
103. 39 N.Y.2d at 335, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87-90.
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rationality."' 10 4 In order for a PAP to be valid, the court decided that racial
preferential treatment must satisfy a "substantial state interest"' 10 5 which
"need not be urgent, paramount or compelling;" however, on balance, any
possible detriment to the rights of nonminorities must be outweighed by "the
gain to be derived from the preferential policy."' 10 6 If such a substantial state
interest were found, a court reviewing a PAP would then inquire as to
whether nonracial or less objectionable racial alternatives exist and, if such
alternatives were absent, the PAP would be valid. 107 The court in Alevy,
however, never decided if the PAP at issue was justified by a substantial
state interest or whether alternative measures less intrusive on nonminority
rights existed, since it was held that the petitioner failed to show that he
10 8
would have been admitted even if the PAP were eliminated.
It is apparent, as the disagreement in the cases examined illustrates,
that the constitutionality of using racial classifications in the context of a
PAP is uncertain." 9 At the present time, it would seem that the validity of
104. Id. at 335-36, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 545-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
108. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92. The Alevy court had
stated the issue in terms of whether "reverse discrimination" was constitutional,
defining reverse discrimination as "benign" discrimination, that is, where classifications are utilized to assist certain "groups of persons presumed or shown to be
disadvantaged." Id. at 328 n.2, 348 N.E.2d at 540 n.2, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 84 n.2. The
Alevy court concluded from the record that the defendant had practiced "reverse
discrimination" but never decided whether that discrimination was constitutional. Id.
at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92.
The Alevy court dismissed the petition because it found that the "petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as it relates to this case in that
he failed to show his own right to relief, even if the entire minority program were
eliminated." Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The court emphasized
that it was not saying that the petitioner lacked standing but merely that he did not
demonstrate his "ultimate right to obtain relief' and "[s]tanding... does not depend
on a threshold demonstration of the narrower, final right, to an individual remedy."
Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92, citing inter alia, Burke v.
Sugarman, 35 N.Y.2d 39, 44, 315 N.E.2d 772, 774, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (1974).
109. The matter is made more complicated by the fact that one court has held that
the use of racial criteria in admissions procedures must be intended from the outset
and the state must set forth some basis for justifying the discrimination from the
start. Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Hupart,
white and Asian applicants to a biomedical program brought suit in federal district
court seeking admission to the program and/or monetary damages for the unlawful
denial of admission. The applicants alleged, inter alia, that discrimination on racial
grounds had been practiced against them. Id. at 1090. In an attempt to select
candidates for admission, a subcommittee of the program had intentionally
eliminated nonminorities because of their race from an original list of qualified
applicants thereby giving a racial preference to minorities. Id. at 1096, 1103. The
district court held that the discrimination in the case violated the equal protection and
due process clauses because the subcommittee had "deviated from University policy,
as enforced by state law." Id. at 1106-07. The defendants - the school board and the
city college of the city university - had maintained that they did not practice any
discrimination on the basis of race and that if, in fact, the subcommittee did
discriminate, it was in violation of the policy of the admissions committee, the
university and the school board. Id. at 1105. The Hupart court reasoned, therefore,
that the utilization of racial criteria in the admissions procedures was not the issue to
be decided, since "it is clear that the state cannot justify making distinctions on the
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any PAP would depend on the particular jurisdiction in which it is
challenged. There is no absolute answer to the question of what justifications a court would require to validate racial classifications. Whether the
state interest proffered must be compelling, substantial, or merely reasonable, and whether merely reasonable or the least objectionable means could
be used to further that interest is abstruse. An examination of precedent and
present case law evidences only a state of confusion."10
B.

The Standard of Review

Applying equal protection in the PAP context raises several problems.
Even if it is established that there is state action,"' and that the specific
claim is justiciable,"12 there remains the troublesome issue of the appropriate
basis of race without having first made a deliberate choice to do so." Concluding that
the subcommittee's intentional elimination of only nonminority candidates was an

infringement of equal protection rights, the Hupart court emphasized that distinctions

based upon race must be justified before their implementation. Id. at 1106. The court

declined to decide whether such a justification had to be rational, compelling or
"something in between," but held that the justifying basis must be supplied by
"appropriate state officials before they take any action" and stated that "[t]he
defendants cannot sustain their burden of justification by coming to court with an
array of hypothetical and post-facto justifications for discrimination that has
occurred either without their approval or without their conscious and formal choice to
discriminate as a matter of official policy." Id. at 1106 (emphasis supplied by the
court).
110. It is interesting to note that a federal district court recently held that a law
school's financial policy which allocated a grossly disproportionate amount of its
scholarship funds to minority students violated the antidiscrimination provisions of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C.

1976). In that case, the court concluded:

While an affirmative action program may be appropriate to ensure that all
persons are afforded the same opportunities or are considered for benefits on the
same basis, it is not permissible when it allocates a scarce resource (be it jobs,
housing, or financial aid) in favor of one race to the detriment of others.
Id. at 384.
In addition, a recent United States Supreme Court decision has stated that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975) and
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) prohibit racial discrimination against white persons under the
standards applicable when a nonwhite alleges discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The Bakke majority, rejecting the university's
contention that the court should apply a rational basis test in determining the
validity of the PAP, had concluded that deprivation based upon race was not subject
to a "less demanding standard of review" simply because it was the majority rather
than the minority who suffered discrimination. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 533 P.2d at 1164, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 692. While the Bakke court recognized that there were no Supreme Court
decisions directly on this point, McDonald was cited in support of their conclusion as
a manifestion of "the high court['s] ... marked reluctance to apply different
standards to determine the rights of minorities and members of the majority." Id. The
Bakke dissent, however, distinguished McDonald, stating that the "racial discrimination at issue in that case was unrelated to any affirmative action program." Id. at 69
n.3, 533 P.2d at 1176 n.3, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 704 n.3.
111. See note 13 supra.
112. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the claim was dismissed as moot
because the claimant had been admitted to law school during the litigation and was
about to graduate. Id. at 319-20. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.There may
also be a problem with standing, especially where it is clear that the applicant would
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standard of review. Recently the United States Supreme Court granted,
certiorari to hear Bakke; 113 however, until the Court decides that case, the
standard of review applicable to PAP's remains an open question. It is
suggested that the determination of the propriety of any standard must be
derived from a focus upon the nature, purpose, and effect of the
classification in question, analyzed in the light of general constitutional
principles.
In Brown I, racial classifications which marked the excluded race with a
stamp of inferiority were held unconstitutional per se. 114 Mere exclusion,
however, is not tantamount to being branded as inferior'1 5 In Brown I, not
not have been admitted even if there were no PAP. The claim in Alevy was dismissed
for just this reason. 39 N.Y.2d at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91; see note
108 supra.
113. 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
114. 347 U.S. at 494; see notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
115. It has been argued that racial classifications detrimental to minorities are
suspect because they "will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and a badge
of opprobrium." Developments, supra note 22, at 1127. The mere exclusion of a
majority applicant does not seem detrimental in this sense, because it is doubtful that
the entire majority race has been stigmatized because of the exclusion of a few
members.
However, the focus upon the group nature of the detriment raises the question
of the individual/group nature of the equal protection challenge. In Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court emphasized:
The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its
terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights. It
is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say that the courts may also be
induced to deny white persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds of
race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.
Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). The individual challenging the PAP seems to be asserting
an individual, not a group right to equal protection because in the professional school
context, members of the majority race constitute the bulk of students admitted. This
position has been questioned because basic to equal protection is classification, a
group conceptualization. See Alexander, The High Court and the Bakke Decision: Is
Affirmative Action Reverse Discrimination?STUDENT LAWYER, January, 1977, 16, 1718. It seems that a court, by focusing on the equal protection challenge to a PAP as an
individual right not only misconstrues the nature of the action generally but also
specifically since an individual's claim to fair treatment may be more attractive and
seem more compelling than the majority-minority conflict inherent in the claim.
The challenge to the PAP seems to be both an individual and a group claim.
At the same time that the individual is attacking a PAP and the group preference it
entails, he is also seeking relief upon group terms by asserting his group's right to
defeat a preference afforded to another group, a preference which is detrimental to the
excluded group. It is clear that a ruling on a PAP will have a group effect. The
individual nature of the action must nevertheless be recognized also. Any decision
should consider the possibility that the majority group is not so homotypical that the
gains of those admitted satisfactorily absorb the losses of those rejected. Professor Ely
seems to view the majority group as homogeneous. He states:
A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice;
nor is it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of
Whites relative to those of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an
alternative classification that extend to certain Whites and the advantages
generally extended to Blacks.
Ely, supra note 1, at 735 (footnote omitted). This argument has been criticized for its
view of the majority group and of the political process in general. See Posner, supra
note 3, at 20-21. The California Supreme Court in Bakke also criticized Ely's view,
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only were blacks excluded from white schools, but, conversely, whites were
excluded from black schools. The fact that white students may have been
denied an opportunity to attend black schools did not result in a finding that
white students were branded as inferior. 116 It is submitted, therefore, that
branding by exclusion has been recognized as affecting minorities only.11 7
It could be argued that a PAP has such a branding effect on minority
professional school students. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter,"58 the
United States Supreme Court invalidated racial discrimination in a law school
admission, finding that the separate but superficially equal facilities were
separate and intangibly unequal." 9 It has been suggested that validating a
PAP's separate and unequal admissions procedures might tend to create
within the professional school the situation found offensive in Sweatt
- that minority students admitted preferentially will feel inferior. 12° This
argument, while plausible, is at once too hypothetical and too remote; it is
unclear whether minority students admitted through a PAP do feel inferior,
and it is generally the majority, not the minority, students who challenge
the PAP. 21 It is doubtful that PAP's could be ruled unconstitutional per se
on the ground of any branding effect on minorities.
The dissent in the state court decision in DeFunis apparently found that
the PAP was so detrimental to the majority that it should be ruled
unconstitutional per se. 122 According to this view, exclusion based solely
upon race would have been invalid per se under Brown 1.123 It is submitted

and asserted that "the complexion of the person who discriminates cannot be a
significant factor in deciding whether an individual has been deprived of his right to
equal protection." 18 Cal. 3d at 52 n.18, 553 P.2d at 1164 n.18, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692

n.18.

To tell the excluded applicant that his race is sufficiently represented and that

members of another race, persons who may be less qualified than he, must be
accepted in his place for the greater good seems to address insufficiently the needs
and desires of that applicant. Thus, it is suggested that it is better to recognize that
the claim encompasses both individual and group aspects.
116. 347 U.S. at 494. The Court in Brown I focused only on the exclusion of blacks

and it seems clear that the purpose underlying the discrimination was to keep blacks
out, not to harm whites. Id. at 493.
117. See Ely, supra note 1, at 728-33; Developments, supra note 22 at 1127.
118. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

119. Id. at 633-36. Petitioner, a law school applicant denied admission to the

University of Texas Law School because of his race, claimed that he was denied equal
protection. Id. at 631. The state argued that the existence of a newly founded law
school for Negroes to which the petitioner could apply and be admitted rendered his
equal protection challenge untenable. Id. at 632. The Supreme Court found that the
alternative offered to the respondent was insufficient because the Negro law school
did not approximate the University of Texas Law School in facilities or faculty and,
therefore, the schools, while separate, were not equal. Id. at 632-35.
120. See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 97 S. Ct.
996, 1011-16 (1977). (Brennan, J., concurring). In Carey, Justice Brennan suggested
that benign classifications be closely scrutinized because the purported preference
might "disguise a policy of discrimination" which "disadvantages minorities." Id. at
4229.

121. Posner labels unclear the "familiar argument" that one singled out for a

preference is humiliated. Posner, supra note 3, at 12.
122. 82 Wash. 2d at 60-65, 507 P.2d at 1199. (Hale, C. J., dissenting); see notes 6668 and accompanying text supra.

123. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
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that such a reading of Brown I is too broad because, absent a discriminatory
purpose and a branding effect, the classification will not be held
unconstitutional per se.1 24 The reliance on the per se approach also may be
of doubtful validity in the PAP context because the per se ruling has not
been reaffirmed outside of the Brown I school desegregation situation.
Indeed, in several cases where minorities have been harmed, the Supreme
Court has applied a strict scrutiny test rather than adopting a per se
12 5

approach.

Assuming the per se approach is dismissed, perhaps the rational
relation test should be considered. The Supreme Court in Swann held that
school officials seeking to achieve integration could use racial criteria in
their decision.' 2 Some commentators suggest that a proper interpretation of
Swann mandates that voluntary, like court imposed benign or remedial
racial classifications are proper and should be subject only to a rational
relation test. 127 Proponents of PAP's contend that the racial classification
used in those programs are benign and hence subject only to the more
permissive standard of review. 28 It is submitted, however, that while the
purpose of a PAP may be benign, it is not benign in its effect upon the
excluded majority applicant. Of course, the adverse effects of a remedial
classification could be dismissed as a necessary hardship,' 29 for in Swann,
the integration plan imposed upon the students the hardship of being bused
124. Brown Fs per se holding may be interpreted as based upon a finding of
"invidious discrimination." See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 27, 507 P.2d
1169, 1179 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); O'Neil, supra note 1, at 712-18.
The proper meaning of the term "invidious" as used in Brown I is subject to some
dispute. Invidious may be defined as describing a "purposeful" discrimination, or it
may denote a classification which has an adverse or branding effect upon an entire
race. See Development, supra note 22, at 1127. Whatever the proper meaning of
"invidious", it seems clear that PAP's are based neither upon a purely discriminatory
purpose nor do they have a branding effect upon the excluded white applicant. See
Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a DemocraticSociety - JudicialActivism
or Restraint? 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
125. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state statute banning
interracial marriage held unconstitutional); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964) (state statute banning interracial cohabitation held unconstitutional); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (order excluding Japanese from West
Coast during World War II held constitutional). See notes 24-33 and accompanying
text supra.
126. 402 U.S. at 22-25. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
127. See, e.g., Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
65, 73 (1969); Developments, supra note 22, at 1109-13. See also Comment, Increasing
Minority Admissions in Law Schools - Reverse Discrimination?20 BUFFALO L. REV.
473, 479-81 (1971).
128. This argument was made by the law school in DeFunis (see notes 55-65 and
accompanying text supra) and by the medical school in Bakke (see note 72 and
accompanying text supra). See also Comment, supra note 127, at 480-81.
129. The dissent in Bakke dismissed the injury to nonminorities by arguing that
any remedial program has some adverse effect. The dissenter asserted at one point:
The simple reality . . . is that in many circumstances any remedy for the
inequalities flowing from past discrimination will inevitably result in some
detriment to nonminorities. Whenever there is a limited pool of resources from
which minorities have been disproportionately excluded, equalization of opportunity can only be accomplished by a reallocation of such resources; those who have
previously enjoyed a disproportionate advantage must give up some of that
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long distances. 30 However, the inconvenience of busing is shared by all
races generally and should be recognized as less detrimental than the denial
of an opportunity for professional education. Indeed, those courts which
have reviewed the constitutionality of PAP's have noted the adverse effect
and have refused to review the classification under a rational relation
test.' Thus, notwithstanding the benign purpose of a PAP, the nonbenign
effect seems to make mere rationality standards inappropriate.
advantage if those who have historically had less are to be afforded an equitable
share.
18 Cal. 3d at 75, 553 P.2d at 1180, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). See
also Comment, supra note 127, at 479-80.
130. 402 U.S. at 29-31. For a discussion of Swann, see notes 44-48 and
accompanying text supra. See also Ely, supra note 1, at 724.
131. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d
537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169
(1973). Justice Douglas broached this issue in his dissent on the merits in DeFunis.
See, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
The detriment to nonminorities caused by the PAP is a major obstacle to the
argument for deferential review. In the oral argument of DeFunis before the United
States Supreme Court, the following exchange took place between counsel for the
University, Mr. Gorton, and the Court:
MR. GORTON:. . . We have engaged in a voluntary program, very precise in
its outlook. Racial discrimination was the problem, therefore race had to be the
criterion for solving that problem. We are precisely within Mr. Justice Burger's
holding for this entire Court in Swann v. Charlotte, remedial judicial authority
does not put judges in the shoes of school authorities, whose powers are plenary.
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and
implement education policy, and might well conclude, for example, that in order
to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society, each school should have a
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students, reflecting the proportion of the district
as a whole.
To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities.
QUESTION: Is there anything in that context that would keep anyone out of
any school, however,
MR. GORTON: - he [De Funis] was in exactly the same position as the
school children in the Swann case.
MR. GORTON: . .. We were doing, I submit, precisely what you said we had
the discretion to do when you wrote the opinion for the entire Court in the Swann
case.
QUESTION: But you haven't pointed out how that would exclude anyone, as
Mr. DeFunis would have been excluded.
Oral Argument of DeFunis v. Odegaard, reprinted in 3 BLACK L.J. 250, 262-63 (1974).
While an exchange in an oral argument has no weight, 'these passages
certainly indicate the burden the PAP proponent will have to overcome. Justice
Brennan's concurrence in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 96 S. Ct. 996 (1977), suggests that remedial classifications must be scrutinized
to determine their detrimental effects. Id. at 1013-15. Certainly the detriment to the
individual majority applicant is a fundamental issue in determining the validity of a
PAP.
The opponents of PAP's have seized upon this issue. See Graglia, supra note
1, at 354-59. Even those who favor PAP's seem to recognize the importance of this
detrimental effect. For example, Professor Ely acknowledges that the preferential
"selection system in controversy quite tangibly disadvantages Whites." Ely, supra
note 1, at 730 n. 36.
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The dismissal of the rationality standard in the two-tiered approach to
equal protection seems to confine review to strict scrutiny, the standard
32
which has been applied in most cases where a race has been harmed.
Perhaps, a different standard of review should apply because of the remedial
purpose of the PAP.1 33 Although the applicability of a middle level of
scrutiny has received only limited acceptance,134 an argument can be
proffered that classifications with remedial purposes and detrimental
effects, or "quasi-benign" classifications, should be reviewed outside the twotiered approach.
Apparently the Bakke dissent, which focused on the benign prointegration purpose of the PAP' 35 and recognized the detriment it
necessarily entailed,1 36 tacitly determined that the PAP classification was
"quasi-benign" and, therefore, better suited to analysis under a standard
somewhere between rationality and strict ,crutiny. The dissent suggested a
standard where the ends had to be compelling but the means had only to be
rationally related to the compelling end. 37 This standard, however, appears
to have no judicial support, 138 and its acceptance, it is submitted, would
result in the adoption of a new special standard of review applicable only in
a narrow area. Moreover, the suggestion for this new standard seems to
have been based upon a belief that a PAP would not be found constitutional
under the strict scrutiny test.'3 9

132. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
133. The purpose of the PAP is to integrate not segregate. See Comment, supra
note 127, at 479-82.
134. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973) (White,
J., concurring). See generally, Gunther, supra note 18, at 20-48; Nowak, Realigning
the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee - Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classification,62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1073-79 (1974); Comment,
"Newer" Equal Protection: The Impact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 665 (1974). The Supreme Court's recent decisions of Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S.
Ct. 1021 (1977) and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) should be noted for their
indication that a middle level of scrutiny is cognizable. See note 18 supra.
135. 18 Cal. 3d at 67-80, 553 P.2d at 1177, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705. (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting). See notes 87-96 and accompanying text supra.
136. Id. at 73-75, 553 P.2d at 1179-80, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707-09. (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting). See generally, Ely, supra note 1, at 730 n.36.
137. 18 Cal. 3d at 89, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18. (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting). See notes 87-96 and accompanying text supra.
138. The standard does not seem to be a "sliding scale" as suggested by Justice
Marshall in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting), nor does the proposed test employ the means-focused
standard suggested by Gunther, supra note 18, at 20-24.
139. In suggesting a less strict means test, the dissent in Bakke could have found
that the strict scrutiny "means" requirement could not be overcome. 18 Cal. 3d at 89,
553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18. (Tobriner, J., dissenting). It is unclear why
the dissent did not argue for upholding the PAP under strict scrutiny, since the
possibility that a PAP could pass strict review is certainly not improbable given the
holding by the Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis. See notes 55-65 and
accompanying text supra.
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Possibly the "sliding scale" standard4O for consideration of equal
protection challenges should be established to review "quasi-benign"
classifications such as PAP's. This approach, prompted by a dissatisfaction
with the rigidity of the two-tiered method of review has at least some
support, 14 1 and it may provide a standard sufficiently flexible to enable a
reconciliation between pro-integration programs and their detrimental
effects. Certainly the Alevy standard which requires very narrow means and
substantial ends indicates such an approach. 4 2 While the narrowness of the
means which the Alevy version of the "sliding scale" would require is
unclear,14 3 it appears to consider more fully the "quasi-benign" nature of a
PAP, than the new standard proposed by the Bakke dissent does.
Although a middle level of scrutiny similar to that proposed by Alevy.
may be desirable, such an analysis has not yet achieved general support
from the bench.1 44 Because equal protection challenges have generally been
reviewed under the two-tiered approach, the issue of the appropriate
standard of review for PAP's comes down to a choice between the rational
relation test and the strict scrutiny test. 145 Because of the detrimental effects
of PAP's" 46 and the established tradition of reviewing detrimental racial
classifications under strict scrutiny, 147 it is submitted that where the court is
faced with a choice between rational and strict review, the latter standard
should prevail. However, a decision to review under strict scrutiny does not
answer the basic question of the constitutionality of a PAP, for the
majorities in Bakke and DeFunis certainly indicate that conflicting results
are possible under the same strict standard of review. 48 It is submitted that
strict scrutiny merely provides a focus for reviewing the classification and
that the final resolution, with the possibility of conflicting decisions on a
140. See San Antonio Ind. School
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v.
J., dissenting). See generally, Gunther,
141. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.

Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973)
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall,
supra note 18, at 20-24.
441, 456 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San

Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Gunther, supra note 18, at 21-22. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 25,
at 657-64, 682-90, 845-50. For an explanation of the "sliding scale" approach, see
note 18 supra.
142. For a discussion of Alevy, see notes 97-108 and accompanying text supra.The
Alevy court apparently felt that the "quasi-benign" elements of the PAP made the
two-tiered approach inappropriate. See notes 97-105 and accompanying text supra.
143. While the Alevy court proposed a means review in which it had to be shown
"that no nonracial, or least objectionable racial, classifications will serve the same
purpose." 39 N.Y.2d at 337, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 90, the specific issue of
the objectionability of the PAP under review was not considered because the
nonthreshold standing problem was dispositive once the propriety of the ends was
considered. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92; see notes 107-108 and
accompanying text supra.
144. But see note 18 supra.
145. See notes 17-33 and accompanying text supra.
146. For a discussion of the adverse effect of PAP's on minority students, see notes
118-121 and accompanying text supra. See also Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 571-72.
147. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
148. Both cases applied strict scrutiny but with different results. See notes 55-86
and accompanying text supra.
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PAP, must be traced to the ends and means of the classification as defined
and limited under the standard of review.
C.

The Ends and the Means

A court's view of what ends may be properly achieved by admissions
committees and the means for accomplishing those ends may ultimately
determine the validity of a PAP. Assuming that the two-tiered approach is
employed and that strict scrutiny review is thus applicable, compelling ends
and the least restrictive means for accomplishing those ends will be required
for a PAP to be constitutional. 14 9
The primary goal of a PAP is to increase minority representation in the
school and the profession. 50 The determination that this goal is or is not
compelling may depend upon what is seen as the proper ends of professional
education. While there is strong argument for increasing minority representation in the professions, 15' there is also a recognizable counterargument
that the integration of the professions is neither a proper nor a substantial
purpose of higher education. 152 A fundamental premise underlying the latter
argument is that the overriding purpose of professional education is to
5 3
prepare the best qualified professionals.1
149. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra. See generally G. GUNTHER,
supra note 25, at 698-702.
150. One commentator has hypothesized a different constitutional focus, suggesting that a hidden purpose - the exclusion of certain ethnic groups by the acceptance
of other ethnic minorities - may cause a significant constitutional problem. Henkin,
DeFunis: An Introduction, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 488-89 n.24 (1975). Professor
Graglia attacks the validity of this integration end. Graglia, supra note 64, at 241-43.
151. In DeFunis, the Washington Supreme Court outlined three possible motivations for increasing minority representation in the professions. See Posner, supra note
3, at 26, identifying the fear of minority unrest as the motivation for integrating
universities.
152. The dissent in the state court's holding in DeFunis apparently felt that
integration was not a proper end of higher education, suggesting that, while
integration was a proper and generally, its effectuation was not to be accomplished by
professional school admissions committees. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text
supra. Professor Graglia concurs in this approach. Graglia, supra note 64, at 234.
153. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in DeFunis suggested:
The State . . . may not proceed by racial classification to force strict population
The Equal Protection
equivalencies for every group in every occupation ....
Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to
satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. The purpose of the
University of Washington cannot be to produce Black lawyers for Blacks, Polish
lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to
produce good lawyers for Americans.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This passage points
out the conflict between the integration end and the training the best qualified
professionals end which complicates the argument over the constitutionality of
PAP's. While it seems apparent that Justice Douglas would not go as far as saying
that integration is not a proper end or a compelling interest, id. at 341-44, the dissent
in the state court opinion in DeFunis arguably takes this approach. See notes 66-68
supra. Professor Graglia seems to feel that the concern for minority representation in
the professions may not be the proper business of the admissions committees,
suggesting instead that the business of professional education is to educate the best
people:
The most specific and frequent argument for the new admissions policy is
simply that there are too few Negro lawyers, that Negroes are "underrepresented"
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Implicit in this ends conflict is a means conflict. Simply stated, those
who consider integration to be compelling may allow, or even demand,
5
efficient, race-conscious means for accomplishing this end,T1
while those
who see the "best qualified" end as compelling may dismiss race as an
improper indicator of qualification, recommending that admissions decisions be based solely on quantifiable aptitude indicators or what can be
termed "merit" considerations.155
It is submitted that while both ends should be recognized as valid, this
recognition does not answer the ends problem, because it does not indicate
which end is more significant. A decision ascribing the relative importance
of the ends appears inescapable because, unfortunately, these ends cannot
in the legal profession. As one proponent of the policy has stated, "All should
recognize that the current shortage of Negro attorneys has reached crisis
proportions." The exact nature of the "crisis" is not made clear. We would
undoubtedly all be happier if all definable groups were proportionately
represented in all social categories, employment and other - it would be
consistent with democratic ideals. . . . It is, however, even more consistent with,
indeed required by, the democratic ideal that people not be classified - and
neither taught nor expected to classify others - on the grounds of race. I do not
know that Negroes do or should prefer that their attorneys be Negroes, or that
Negro attorneys can more effectively represent their interests. To assume, accept,
and even urge, otherwise seems to me to verge upon racism, to use that most
common and forceful of epithets. Achievement of proportional representation of
different groups is not a proper goal of higher education. . . . Society needs the
best lawyers it can get, regardless of racial or ethnic derivation.
Graglia, supra note 64, at 234 (footnote omitted). Professor Bell criticizes this view.
Bell, supra note 64, at 241-43.
154. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 36, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184. Professor
Posner criticizes this view, arguing that efficiency considerations should not validate
a suspect classification. Posner, supra note 3, at 11-15.
The race-conscious means approach springs from the argument for color
consciousness in the short run to achieve true color blindness in the long run. See
Comment, supra note 127, at 485. The author offers the following analysis of the
situation:
This argument has often been illustrated by analogy to a footrace. Let us suppose
that there are two runners at the start of a footrace; one of them is shackled while
the other is unencumbered. As the race progresses, the shackled runner drops far
behind. If at this point the shackles were removed and the race permitted to
continue, would the result be fair? Does it make a difference who placed the
shackles on the runner? If the race was a relay, does it make a difference that the
subsequent runners are no longer shackled? The answers to these questions are
an emphatic "no."
It is quite apparent that what fairness demands is that an adjustment be
made so that the race can continue on a more nearly equal basis. Of course, the
unshackled runner is relinquishing his advantage in the process, but he cannot be
heard to complain as he was not entitled to it in the first place.
Id. at 485 n.60.
155. The dissent in the state court decision in DeFunis seems to argue for a merit
approach. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra. Professor Graglia also
seems to prefer merit as the basis of decision. Graglia, supra note 64 at 236-37.
Professor Posner, on the other hand, approaches the question from a suspect versus
nonsuspect means formulation which would not limit the decision makers to pure
merit considerations. Posner, supra note 3, at 21-26. Professor Bell criticizeA the
qualified/merit view. See Bell, supra note 64, at 241-43. Mr. Baeza attacks the merit
approach for its lack of utility in addressing social needs. See Baeza, supra note 64, at
132-40.
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be fully achieved simultaneously. Admission based solely upon merit criteria
to achieve the best qualified end would not result in significant integration,
and admission by efficient race-conscious means to achieve the integration
end would result in some subordination of the best qualified end.15 6 In
weighing these conflicting approaches, it is suggested that the best qualified
end is a mere abstraction which should be subordinated to the integration
end in a decision on a PAP because of the confusing nature of the term
"qualification" and the reality of the admissions process.
Proponents of selection by merit criteria alone tend to describe those
applicants who are not "best qualified" as "unqualified.' ' 57 The validity of
the merit criteria as indicators of professional qualification is debatable,158
however, and even assuming that merit criteria are to some extent indicative
of qualification, it is submitted that those admitted through a nonmerit
15 9
preference are sufficiently qualified to perform the work demanded.
Moreover, while the ideal may be 'that professional schools admit only those
best qualified, the reality of the admissions process seems to undercut this
ideal. For example, a commendable interest in aiding veterans and state
residents by affording them educational and occupational preferences has
prompted professional school admission committees to consider these

156. There might be no problem if the merit indicia, that is, the scores and marks
of minority students, approximated those of non-minorities. Unfortunately, this is not
often the case. For instance, there was a significant difference in merit indicia of the
minority students admitted in Bakke and the majority students excluded. See note 70
supra.
157. Graglia, supra note 64, at 233-34. Professor Graglia seems to be concerned
that the desire to have minorities admitted could result in unqualified professionals.
He says:
My basic objection to the new admissions policy is that, insofar as it results
in the admission of unqualified or unprepared students to law schools, it is likely
to benefit no one and harm many. Whatever the validity, in general, of the
principle that racial discrimination may be used as a means of compensation for
past injustices, it can have no application to the admission of unqualified
students to institutions of higher education. Inadequate grade school, high school,
and college educational opportunities cannot be redressed by offering quality law
school education. In quality education it is not possible to begin at the top.
Denying admission to qualified students because they were black was a very
great wrong; granting admission to unqualified students because they are black is
not the remedy.
Id. at 233. Admitting only the most meritorious applicants would be the best approach
according to this view.
158. Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis pointed out the significant problem in
weighing standardized test scores. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 327-31.
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For a criticism of the merit criteria, see Baeza, supra note 64,
at 146-49).
159. Justice Tobriner, dissenting in Bakke, asserted:
[T]he majority incorrectly assert that the minority students accepted under the
special admission program are "less qualified" - under the medical school's own
standards - than nonminority applicants rejected by the medical school. ...
This is simply not the case. The record establishes that all the students accepted
by the medical school are fully qualified for the study of medicine.
18 Cal. 3d at 66, 553 P.2d at 1173, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Tobriner, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original). See also Bell, supra note 64, at 241-43.
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nonmerit qualifications as important factors. 16 1 Similarly, it is submitted
that in achieving the goal of integration, admissions committees should be
allowed to look beyond pure merit indicators.
Assuming that the end of minority representation should be given
greater weight than the "best qualified merit" approach, the decision
whether a PAP will be found constitutional under strict scrutiny review may
depend upon the definition given that end. This definitional problem can be
described as one of degree, essentially involving the rate at which the goal of
minority representation should be accomplished. 16 1 The definition which a
court gives to the minority representation end may also be determinative of
the means which that court will allow. An even greater problem lies in the
definition of the word compelling. Defining the minority representation end
as compelling - meaning that there is a need for a fast rate of integration might possibly necessitate efficient, albeit suspect, race-based means.'6 2 On
the other hand, defining the end as compelling - meaning that integration
need only be achieved at a somewhat slower rate - might possibly limit
163
effectuation to nonsuspect, racially neutral means.
Recognition of the fact that the validity of a PAP may depend on
whether a court determines that the compelling interest to increase minority
representation is to be accomplished at a relatively faster or slower rate may
explain some of the differences between the Bakke and DeFunis opinions.
The Bakke court, using strict scrutiny, found the PAP under review to be
unconstitutional, 6 , while the DeFunis court found its PAP to be constitutional purportedly under that same standard of review. 165 In formulating its
decision, the Bakke majority apparently reasoned that a suspect classification should never be allowed if viable nonsuspect alternative methods of
achieving the goal existed.166 By contrast, the DeFunis court dismissed the
alternative means by suggesting that these means were insufficient to
accomplish the compelling end.' 67 Simply stated, Bakke preferred racially

160. For some examples of preference given to veterans, see Nickel, supra note 9, at
534 nn.4&5. The plaintiff in DeFunis claimed that, as a resident of the state of
Washington, he should be given a preference in admissions to the state school. 82
Wash. 2d at 42-43, 507 P.2d at 1187-88. The court dismissed this contention. Id. at 43,
507 P.2d at 1188. The dissent disagreed, arguing that the state taxpayers should be
given a preference. Id. at 50-51, 507 P.2d at 1191-92 (Hale, C. J., dissenting).
161. See generally Sandalow, supra note 2, at 690-92.
162. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 36, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973); Ely,
supra note 1, at 730-33; Sandalow, supra note 2, at 687-92.
163. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 53-55, 553 P.2d 1152,
1165-66, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 693-94 (1976). Professor Posner argues for nonsuspect
means. He asserts that "the impact of eliminating racial preference is easily
exaggerated. The preferred groups could be redefined as the underprivileged, the
deprived, etc. - classifications not based on race or ethnic origin. The constitutional
objection to preferential treatment would thereby be removed, without substantial
impairment of the purpose of such treatment." Posner, supra note 3, at 32.
164. For a discussion of Bakke, see notes 69-81 and accompanying text supra.
165. For a discussion of DeFunis, see notes 55-65 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
167. See note 65 supra.
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neutral means 68 while DeFunis would allow race-conscious, efficient
169
means.
Assuming that both courts correctly applied the least restrictive means
element of strict scrutiny,1 70 and that the different results cannot be traced
to factual distinctions,17 1 it is submitted that the DeFunis court saw the
meaning of a compelling end to be a faster rate of increase in integration
than the Bakke court did. Certainly the means allowed by DeFunis would
result in faster integration than those proposed by Bakke.172 'Moreover, it is
doubtful that the nonsuspect reclassification pattern proposed by Bakke
would accomplish the goal of minority representation to a very significant
extent because a social-deprivation preference seems directed to a different
interest.' 7
If the viability of the means proposed by Bakke is dubious, 174 a similar
question arises about DeFunis since it is questionable that the need for
minority professionals is so urgent or compelling that programs employing
race conscious means should pass strict scrutiny review. 75 It is possible that
the present lack of minority professionals could be described as an
emergency situation similar to the wartime circumstances in Korematsu v.
United States; 76 it is submitted, however, that the fast rate of integration
promoted by DeFunis is not a sufficiently compelling interest to meet the
test of strict scrutiny.
Perhaps the two-tiered approach should be abandoned in the case of
"quasi-benign" classifications - since neither rational nor strict review
seems aimed at the specific problem of benign race consciousness - and a
168. See notes 69-86 and accompanying text supra..
169. The DeFunis court seemed to consider the PAP the most efficient means of
integrating the professions and therefore allowable. See notes 55-65 supra. See also
Ely, supra note 1, at 730-33.
170. It could be argued that the DeFunis court, while allegedly reviewing the PAP
under strict scrutiny, sub silentio, employed a different standard of review. In
determining the means to the compelling end, the court seemed to focus on the best,
not the least restrictive means of achieving minority representation. 82 Wash. 2d at
36, 507 P.2d at 1184.
171. Perhaps the Bakke court, more than the majority in DeFunis, focused on the
quota aspects of the PAP.
172. A program which focuses on the race of the applicant undoubtedly
accomplishes the goal of a racial mix more efficiently.
173. A reclassification approach, such as defining the preference to be one for
"socially deprived" students will not result in quick achievement of minority
representation because others will undoubtedly fit this description. Moreover, some
minority applicants who do not fit within the classification may be excluded. See
Sandalow, supra note 2, at 690-92.
174. Professor Sandalow criticizes the reclassification procedure suggested by
Professor Posner. Id. The Bakke court's reclassification method is subject to similar
criticism. See notes 69-86 supra.
175. One case in which racial classification was upheld under strict scrutiny was
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Most cases applying strict scrutiny,
however, have invalidated racial classifications. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also notes 24-33 and
accompanying text supra.
176. 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944). See note 25 supra. If the lack of minority
representation in the professions constitutes an emergency of crisis proportions, then
drastic, expedient, and suspect means may be necessary.
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middle level, 77 like that of Alevy, 178 applied. The fact remains, however,
that PAP's involve racial classifications which have always been deemed to
be suspect and subject to strict review. 17 9 The mere fact that a PAP purports
to aid one race'8 0 seems insufficient to remove its consideration from strict
review, especially since the implementation of the PAP may have an
8 2
adverse effect on another race' 8' and on racial relations in general.
Strict scrutiny demands least restrictive alternatives, and suspect
means are not allowed if there are' nonsuspect alternatives.'8 3 It seems
apparent therefore, that the existence of viable nonsuspect means should
prevent the PAP from being upheld under strict scrutiny. 8 4 Accordingly, it
is doubtful that PAP's should be upheld unless an alternative approach,
similar to that proposed by Bakke, is used. 85 A PAP may be the easiest or
most efficient means of accomplishing minority representation in the
professions, 8 6 but where there is a choice between efficiency and less
restrictive alternatives, it seems the latter should prevail. Moreover, if a PAP
is to be considered constitutional under strict scrutiny, it is suggested that
factors, other than efficiency, must be present before the necessity of using
177. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
178. For discussion of the standard proposed by Alevy, see notes 98-108 and

accompanying text supra.
179. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
180. For discussion of the benign aspects of PAP's, see notes 126-131 and
accompanying text supra.
181. The excluded applicant is harmed. For discussion of the detrimental effects of

PAP's, see notes 131-135 and accompanying text supra.
182. Granting preferences to one race over another could lead to racial unrest. Race
consciousness could breed race hatred. See United Jewish Organizations of
Williansburgh, Inc v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. at 1012-m-15 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan would look closely at benign racial classifications to see whether they would
tend to increase society's "latent race consciousness." Id. at 4229 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
183. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
184. Several alternative means suggested include a reclassification procedure or
some type of nondetrimental affirmative action. For an examination of some
reclassification methods, see Posner, supra note 3, at 32. The Bakke court also
proposed some affirmative action measures. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text
supra.
185. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra. Perhaps guidelines similar to
those enacted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) should be
used by professional school admissions committees. According to these guidelines:
"Affirmative action" requires the contractor to do more than ensure
employment neutrality with regard to race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin. . . . [A]ffirmative action requires the employer to make additional efforts
to recruit, employ and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded,
even if that exclusion cannot be traced to particular discriminatory actions on the
part of the employer.
37 Fed. Reg. 24,687 (1972) (Guidelines established by HEW, at 2-3). The HEW made it
clear that "affirmative action" should not constitute preferential treatment. According to the guidelines:
In the area of academic appointment, a nondiscriminatory selection process
does not mean that an institution should indulge in "reverse discrimination" or
"preferred treatment" which leads to the selection of unqualified persons over
qualified ones. Indeed to take such action on grounds of race, ethnicity, sex or
religion constitutes discrimination in violation of the Executive Order.
Id. HEW Guidelines at 8. See Solomon and Heeter, supra note 9, at 46-50.
186. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 692.
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race conscious means can be demonstrated. One such factor could be
evidence of de jure discrimination' 87 against specific minorities either by
the individual school, the schools in general, or the standardized tests. For
instance, if it could be demonstrated that the standardized tests are de jure
discriminatory toward, a specific minority, then the means allowed to
combat this discrimination arguably should be race conscious. 188 It seems,
however, that absent such evidence, alternative means such as nonracial
criteria or nondetrimental affirmative action should be required, at least,
until there is evidence that the alternatives do not accomplish the proposed
89
goal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this project has been to define and discuss the problems
involved in deciding the constitutionality of PAP's. Three different courts
have wrestled with the problem, each court reaching different conclusions
concerning both the appropriate standard of review and the ultimate result
required upon the application of a particular test. Moreover, within the three
decisions there are five different opinions about the various questions which
arise concerning a PAP. In summary, there are different views concerning
the standard of review, the ends of a PAP, the ends of professional
education, the compelling nature of the ends, the speed at which the ends
must be achieved, if at all, and the various means for accomplishing the end,
however that end is defined. The commentators also seem to be at odds over
these issues.
From this conflict of opinion, certain conclusions may perhaps be
drawn. First, assuming that the two-tiered approach to equal protection
challenges is not abandoned, and assuming further that rationality
standards are inappropriate because of the suspect nature of racial
187. For a discussion of de jure discrimination, see note 43 supra.
188. Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis criticized the use of the Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) as a predictor of professional promise. 416 U.S. at 328-31
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He also noted that evidence that the LSAT was de jure
discriminatory might have enabled the University to jusify their PAP. Id. at 331-41.
The Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis discussed and dismissed the question
summarily because there seemed to be insufficient evidence to support a finding of de
jure discrimination. See note 43 supra. Perhaps, if evidence of de jure discrimination
could be adduced, then race conscious remedial measures would be more supportable.
Certainly, the employment cases such as Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970),
would lend some support in such a case.
189. The use of reclassification methods can be criticized because they may be only
indirectly related to the goal of integration and because minorities who do not meet
the new classification criteria will not be admitted. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at
690-92. The reclassification approach may be more palatable because one of its major
effects is to increase the number of deprived minority applicants who might otherwise
be excluded from participating in a PAP. See Posner, supra note 3, at 32. Of course,
the reclassification procedure may not achieve integration as quickly as some might
desire. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 691.
The major argument against nondetrimental affirmative action, such as
aggressive recruiting of minorities, may be its inefficiency and the increased burden
such actions would place upon the resources of admissions committees. See Sandalow,
supra note 2, at 691-92.
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classifications, then strict scrutiny should apply. If strict scrutiny is indeed
applicable, then it is doubtful that PAP's will be upheld. This conclusion is,
of course, based upon the assumption that the minority representation end
will not be defined as requiring a fast rate of integration and that the lack of
minority professionals will not be seen as an emergency situation requiring
drastic measures. It is assumed also that there exists no de jure
discrimination against specific minorities requiring race-conscious remedial
measures. Absent a showing of one of these factors; it seems probable that
PAP's cannot withstand strict scrutiny.
While there may be a compelling need for minority professionals, there
is also a constitutional tradition against the use of suspect classifications. It
may be said that the difficult case makes the law; surely, the consideration
of PAP's will sorely test the two-tiered approach to equal protection. Perhaps
the two-tiered approach will fall because of the "quasi-benign" nature of
PAP's and a middle level of review will be adopted. However, as the law now
exists, PAP's seem to deny equal protection.
Edward J. Charlton
Robert E. Heideck
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